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A B ST R ACT. The intuitive idea that failed attempts to complete crimes are often themselves
crimes belies the complexity and confusion surrounding the adjudication of criminal attempts.
This Article offers an account of the grounds for the criminalization of attempt that provides the
courts with sorely needed substantive guidance about precisely which kinds of behavior consti-
tute a criminal attempt. The Article focuses on three well-known problems in the adjudication of
attempt that have been particularly baffling both to courts and to commentators: specifying the
line between solicitation and attempt; determining the conditions under which an "impossible"
attempt is still criminal; and identifying the relevance of abandonment to responsibility for and
sentencing of attempts. The Article proposes specific doctrinal recommendations for adjudicat-
ing all three kinds of attempts; these recommendations are implied by the conceptual framework
developed here for thinking about attempt.
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For good reason, attempts to commit crimes are themselves crimes in every
mature legal system. A bungled robbery, a missed shot, a beating that fails to
kill despite the perpetrator's best effort, a would-be rape fought off by the in-
tended victim, a smuggling stopped at the border, and many more failed ef-
forts besides possess the marks of wrongful conduct to which the state should
respond with criminal penalties. And yet courts and commentators have con-
sistently failed to explicitly offer a coherent theory of this fundamental area of
criminal law. Struck by the difficulty of discovering -and the darkness sur-
rounding-principled solutions to adjudicatory problems about attempts, Je-
rome Hall wrote in 1940:
Whoever has speculated on criminal attempt will agree that the prob-
lem is as fascinating as it is intricate. At every least step it intrigues and
cajoles; like la belle dame sans merci, when solution seems just within
reach, it eludes the zealous pursuer, leaving him to despair ever of en-
joying the sweet fruit of discovery.'
Despair no longer. This Article offers a framework for thinking about at-
tempts that solves important problems of adjudication- problems to which we
currently lack principled solutions despite the great frequency with which de-
fendants charged with criminal attempts appear in courtrooms.
The simple intuitive appeal of the idea that attempts are to be punished be-
lies the complexity and confusion that surround their adjudication. Some cases
1. The material in this Article developed out of several previous publications, some of which
were written as replies to critics of earlier expressions of my views about attempts. Although
there are differences between the views I present here and the views I presented in earlier
publications, there are also many similarities. This Article consolidates the disparately ex-
pressed changes in my position and emphasizes the position's doctrinal implications. See
generally GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS: IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
(2010); Gideon Yaffe, Attempts, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAw (Joel Feinberg et al. eds., 2013); Gid-
eon Yaffe, Attempt, Risk-Creation, and Change of Mind: Reflections on Herzog, 9 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 779 (2012); Gideon Yaffe, The Legal Importance of Trying: Reply to Enoch, Dahan-
Katz, and Berman, 6 JERUSALEm REv. LEGAL STUD. 51 (2012); Gideon Yaffe, More Attempts: A
Reply to Duff, Husak, Mele and Walen, 6 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 429 (2012); Gideon Yaffe, Reply to
Jan Broersen, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Steven Sverdlik, 3 JURIS. 489 (2012); Gideon Yaffe, Try-
ing, Acting and Attempted Crimes, 28 LAw & PHIL. 109 (2009); Gideon Yaffe, Trying, Intending
and Attempted Crimes, 32 PHIL. TOPICS 505 (2006); Gideon Yaffe, Trying to Defend Attempts:
Replies to Bratman, Brink, Alexander, and Moore, 19 LEGAL THEORY 178 (2013); Gideon Yaffe,
Trying to Kill the Dead: De Re and De Dicto Intention in Attempted Crimes, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF LAW & LANGUAGE 192-215 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011).
2. Jerome Hall, Criminal Attempt-A Study of Foundations of Criminal Liability, 49 YALE L.J. 789,
789 (1940).
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are black and white, to be sure, but a startling percentage are not. We have a
much less clear idea than we need of what, exactly, we have criminalized in
criminalizing attempt. It is therefore often very difficult to tell if a particular
defendant has committed a criminal attempt; the courts do not know exactly
what they are looking for.3 This confusion manifests itself, for instance, in the
many and various descriptions of the conditions that must be met in order for
the defendant's conduct to constitute more than "mere preparation," several of
which are metaphorical ("direct movement towards" completion, for in-
stance). 4 But it also comes up in many other places, often in contexts in which
the problems seem, at first glance, to be more tractable than courts have actual-
ly found them to be. Consider three well-known problems.
First, the problem of specifying the line between solicitation and attempt:
Ronald Decker paid Wayne Holston $5000 to kill Decker's sister. When Hol-
ston asked Decker if he was sure this is what he wanted, Decker replied, "I am
absolutely, positively, ioo percent sure, that I want to go through with it. I've
never been so sure of anything in my entire life."5 Unfortunately for Decker,
Holston was not a hitman but an undercover cop.6 Decker clearly solicited
murder, a crime for which he could be sentenced for up to nine years in prison
in California, where he lived.7 But did Decker attempt murder? If so, he could
be sentenced to life in prison. When does asking someone to commit a crime
amount to attempting it?
The court in Decker noted that a long string of decisions in California use
the term "slight acts" to refer to conduct in furtherance of a criminal intention
that suffices for attempt of the intended crime.8 Reasoning that since Decker
made a down payment, he engaged in such "slight acts," the court convicted
Decker of attempted murder. But, of course, the question of whether an act is
"slight" or less than slight (whatever that might mean) is no easier to answer
than the question of whether Decker tried to kill his sister. The justices' prob-
3. While many codes have specific sections criminalizing attempts, it is common for them to
say no more than that it is a crime to attempt a crime -without specifying what conditions
need to be met for a person's behavior to constitute an attempt. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 664 (West 2012); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 24, 5 6 (2011); MICH. COMPILED LAWS § 750.92
(2004); TENN. CODE ANN. 9 39-12-101 (2011).
4. See, e.g., Gregg v. United States, 113 F.2d 687, 690 (8th Cir. 1940) (requiring "direct move-
ment towards" the completion of the crime); People v. Collins, 234 N.Y. 355 (1922) (requir-
ing "direct movement towards" completion and an act that "tends but fails" to lead to com-
pletion of the crime).
5. People v. Decker, 157 P.3 d 1017, lO19 (Cal. 2007).
6. Id.
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653f(b) (West 2012).
8. Decker, 157 P.3d at io2.
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lem was that while they were convinced that Decker tried to kill his sister, they
were powerless to explain why that was true, and so they used a bit of entirely
uninformative legal terminology to hide their confusion.
Second, the problem of so-called "impossibility": the defendant in United
States v. Crow had multiple conversations in an Internet chatroom with some-
one going by the name of "StephieFL."9 During the course of their conversa-
tions, StephieFL claimed to be a thirteen-year-old girl. In fact, the messages
were written by an undercover (adult) police officer. Crow was charged with
attempting sexual exploitation of a minor because he tried to convince
StephieFL to send him sexually explicit photographs of herself.1" The complet-
ed offense requires a showing that the person exploited is indeed a minor. Did
Crow attempt sexual exploitation of a minor, or does the fact that it was an
adult he was actually in contact with show that he did not? After all, given that
Crow was chatting with an adult, there was no chance at all that his conduct
would succeed in sexually exploiting a minor. Under which conditions do the
circumstantial elements of the completed crime need to be in place for the at-
tempted crime? And what mental state need the attempter have with respect to
those elements when they are absent?
On appeal, Crow noted that the jurors had not been instructed that for
guilt they must find that the person Crow was attempting to sexually exploit
was in fact a minor." As this is an essential element of the completed crime of
sexual exploitation of a minor, Crow claimed that it was also an essential ele-
ment of the attempt, and so the trial verdict could not stand. 2 Crow was rais-
ing a general question to which an answer is required: do circumstantial ele-
ments of completed crimes need to be in place for attempts of those crimes
(and if not, why not)? But the court, having no idea how to answer this ques-
tion, did not even try to give a reason for its answer, simply asserting that
Crow's argument failed. 3 The judges' problem was that they were quite certain
that Crow was trying to sexually exploit a child in the sense of relevance to crim-
inal responsibility. What they were ill equipped to explain was how that is con-
sistent with the fact that the only person Crow was trying to sexually exploit,
namely the one he was chatting with, was an adult.4 The result is that the court
lacked the tools it needed to explain why it decided the case as it did.
9. United States v. Crow, 164 F. 3 d 229 (sth Cir. 1999).
1o. Id. at 232.
ii. Id. at 234.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 234-35.
14. Impressed by this point, some courts have embraced the result the Crow court endeavored to
avoid, acquitting similarly situated defendants of attempt. On facts very similar to those in
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Third, the problem of determining the relevance or irrelevance of change of
mind to attempt: George Taylor forced his way into the apartment of a
stranger and, "threatening her with a knife, he made aggressive sexual advanc-
es.""5 The court describes what happened next:
Because of her fear of the knife, [the victim] sought to dissuade him-
rather than fighting him or screaming-by "trying to make him believe
he could be [her] boyfriend and he did not have to do it this way." De-
spite these efforts, he carried her into the bedroom where he continued
to touch and rub himself against her and tried to pull down her pants.
After [the victim] "told him he could come to [her] house anytime," he
relented and they "went back to the living room and started talking."
He took off the surgical gloves he had been wearing during the attack,
saying that he was "not going to be needing these anymore. ,6
A bit later, the victim convinced Taylor to accompany her to a liquor store
where they could get a bottle before returning to her apartment. On the way
out, she ducked back into the apartment and locked the door behind her, leav-
ing Taylor in the hall. Taylor knocked on the door and tried without success to
get her to open it. She then called the police. 7 Does the fact that Taylor
changed his mind matter to the case? Does it relieve him of guilt for attempted
rape? Or does it provide a reason for mitigation of sentence? Or neither?
The court in Taylor is in the same lamentable position as the courts in Deck-
er and Crow. Although the judges are confident that in whatever sense Taylor
changed his mind it was not the sense that matters to attempt, they have no
idea in what sense change of mind does matter. Hiding their confusion with a
legal term, they insist that Taylor's change of mind, while "voluntary," was not
"complete."' 8 The court then appeals to a definition of "complete" offered by
the Model Penal Code, and adopted in New York, according to which renunci-
ation is incomplete if the defendant chose merely to wait till a later time to
Crow, for instance, the court in Aplin v. State, 889 NE.2d 882, 884 (Ind. Ct. App. 20o8),
overruled by King v. State, 921 N.E.2d 1288 (Ind. 2010), acquitted the defendant on the
ground that his conduct "did not constitute the offense of attempted Sexual Misconduct
with a Minor, because Detective Claasen [who was posing as a fifteen-year-old girl in his In-
ternet conversations with the defendant] is an adult." King v. State, 921 N.E.2d 1288 (Ind.
2010), however, overruled this decision and brought Indiana law in line with the approach
adopted by the court in Crow.
15. People v. Taylor, 598 N.E.2d 693, 695 (N.Y. 1992).
16. Id.
I7. Id.
18. Id. at 700.
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commit the crime.' 9 The problem is that there is no reason at all to think that
when Taylor stopped his attack and removed his surgical gloves, he was plan-
ning to rape the victim later. He seemed convinced that they would have con-
sensual sex. But the court ignores this glaring fact -perhaps because it can see
no other ground on which to reject Taylor's abandonment defense, and the
judges are convinced (with good reason, as will be shown in this Article) that it
should be rejected.
Judges in the domain of attempts appear to be behaving in the way that le-
gal realists have for years taken to be endemic to judicial behavior: the judges
seem to decide first and rationalize later by appealing to legal concepts like
slight acts and incomplete renunciation, or by simply rejecting arguments for
no stated reason at all. There is little uniformity across jurisdictions, or even
within them, in how courts deal with cases of any of these three sorts. Moreo-
ver, even courts that handle such cases in a consistent manner seem to have no
idea which principles, if any, support their approach.
But as this Article will show, we need not bow to the powerful impulse to
describe what is happening in the law of attempt in the terms of the legal real-
ist. There are valid principles on the basis of which to decide attempt cases;
they have simply been overlooked. Quite often judges are cottoning on to those
principles, even if they are not articulating them. In fact, as will be suggested
here, it is no surprise that judges are catching on, for the relevant principles are
entrenched in ordinary moral thought of the sort that informs many common-
place interactions between people outside of the legal domain. Those principles
are incorporated into the law, it will be suggested, whenever we proscribe
completed conduct.
In ordinary life, and in the law, we implicitly prohibit a set of failed efforts,
or tryings, whenever we prohibit various forms of completed conduct. So the
question of what criminal attempts are -the question of what complexes of
conduct and mental states ought to count as attempts for purposes of criminal
law -is the question of what is necessary and sufficient for implicit prohibition
ig. Id. (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.10(5) (Consol. 2014)). In general, courts have interpreted
the Model Penal Code's conception of "voluntary and complete" renunciation very narrow-
ly. Consider United States v. Bailey, 834 F.2d 218, 226-27 (ist Cir. 1987). The defendant of-
fered a juror money in exchange for a vote to acquit. A day later, the offer was declined.
There was evidence that before the offer was declined, but after it was issued, the defendant
regretted having made the offer and had lost sleep over her decision to do so. The trial court
refused to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of abandonment, a defense modeled
on the Model Penal Code's, and the appellate court upheld this decision on the grounds that
the evidence of "complete" renunciation was insufficient. But since the Model Penal Code
does not require that the defendant take any positive steps toward preventing the comple-
tion of the crime to abandon it, it is far from clear why a reasonable jury could not have
found that Bailey abandoned.
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of the relevant sort. As we will see, the answer is that we have implicitly pro-
hibited conduct guided by an intention that commits the agent to all of the
conditions involved in success. To engage in such conduct is to try in the sense
of relevance to criminal law. Exactly what this means will become clear as we
move forward. Furthermore, as we will see, this deceptively simple set of prin-
ciples ought to underlie, and to some extent does underlie, the doctrinal crimi-
nal law of attempt.
As noted below, the principles motivating the criminalization of attempts
have the following doctrinal implications. First, these principles imply that a
solicitation is an attempt if the element of the crime that the defendant asks an-
other to produce is a result element of the crime, but not if it is an act element.
Second, they imply that circumstantial elements of completed crimes need not
be present for the attempt if the defendant believes or intends that they are in
place, but they do need to be in place if the defendant is merely reckless in this
respect. Third, they imply that while mitigation of sentence is sometimes war-
ranted on grounds of abandonment, it is never appropriate to grant an affirma-
tive defense of abandonment.
To adopt these three doctrinal recommendations would not only provide
much greater uniformity across jurisdictions (and within them) in the adjudi-
cation of attempt. It would also bring our law in line with the fundamental
principles in light of which attempts deserve to be crimes in the first place.
Demonstrating these claims is this Article's fundamental aim.
Part I identifies the simple and intuitive grounds for criminalizing at-
tempts. It also argues that neither of two ordinary notions of what it is to try to
act can be the sense of relevance to criminal law, given the grounds for the
criminalization of attempt. Parts II and III offer an alternative account of the
nature of attempt of relevance to criminal law- an account that is motivated by
the observations offered in Part I. Part II offers a description of the nature of
intention, which is the central component of attempt. The description of inten-
tion builds on and develops recent work in the philosophy of action. Part III
uses this account of intention to explain what it is to try in the sense of rele-
vance to the criminal law. Parts 1, 11, and III therefore comprise the fundamen-
tal theory of criminal attempt offered in this Article. Parts IV, V, and VI use
that theory to solve the problems of solicitation-as-attempt, impossibility, and
change of mind, respectively. Thus, the Article first provides a conceptual
framework for thinking about attempt and then explains how that framework
helps with the construction of justifiable doctrine.
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I. THE SOURCE OF AN ATTEMPT'S CRIMINALITY: THE CRIMINALITY
OF COMPLETION
A. The Transfer Principle
The confusion in the courts can potentially be remedied by an account of
what, exactly, the crime of attempt is. If we know exactly what it is to attempt,
then we can check to see whether someone like Decker or Crow or Taylor did
indeed attempt the crimes they were charged with attempting. Theorists of at-
tempt who have tried to give such accounts are typically divided between the
"subjectivists" and the "objectivists."2° Struck by the fact that attempts are of-
ten harmless -the bullet misses, the child is not abducted, no drugs cross the
border- subjectivists conclude that it must be that attempts are properly pun-
ished thanks to their mens rea elements. From this point of view, attempts are
thought crimes. The fundamental challenge for subjectivists, then, is to explain
why it is not monstrous for a liberal society to punish attempts. The task of
meeting this challenge is typically undertaken by offering an explanation for
how the mental states involved in attempt differ from other thoughts that it
would be monstrous to punish (for example, they involve resolute intention of a
sort that is not idle, but is manifested in action).
Objectivists, by contrast, start with the thought that if attempts were
thought crimes, then it would be monstrous to punish them, and so it must be
that attempts are properly punished thanks to the conduct that they involve;
the emphasis is on actus reus rather than mens rea. The challenge for objectiv-
ists is therefore to explain what it is about the conduct involved in attempt
thanks to which it is punishable despite its harmlessness (for instance, it risks
harm, is "proximate" to harm, or would result in harm if not prevented).
Neither subjectivists nor objectivists have taken seriously the idea that to
attempt is to try. Trying, like all the forms of action that statutes criminalize,
consists of mental states and conduct. So the fact that trying involves these two
20. Too many thinkers have taken positions on attempt to allow for anything close to an ex-
haustive classification here of each as subjectivist or objectivist. The distinction is made in
GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 166-97 (2000). Fletcher defends a form of
objectivism, as does R. A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS (1996). Objectivist leanings, at least,
can be detected in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 69-70 (1881); Francis B.
Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARV. L. REv. 821 (1928); and Peter Westen, Impossibility At-
tempts: A Speculative Thesis, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523 (2oo8). Subjectivism's proponents in-
clude LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY K. FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF
CRIMINAL LAw (2009); Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm
Under the Code, and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERs L.J. 725 (1988); Stephen J. Morse, Rea-
son, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 363; and J.C. Smith, Two Prob-
lems in Criminal Attempts, 7o HARV. L. REV. 422 (1957).
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parts does not distinguish trying from any other form of action. Neither sub-
jectivists nor objectivists have tried to explain the criminalization of attempt
through appeal to what distinguishes trying from other forms of conduct. This
simple fact suggests a middle way worthy of exploration. Perhaps attempts are
crimes because of the peculiar thing they are, namely tryings, and not because
they involve something else (bad thoughts, bad conduct) that there are inde-
pendent grounds for criminalizing.
As a first step toward developing this admittedly abstract idea, consider
something important that we find in ordinary morality. The father tells the
child not to jump on the sofa; no ice cream if she does. Moments later, the
child is charging toward the sofa with the intention of jumping on it. The fa-
ther stops her and says, "That's just what I told you not to do!" Imagine that
the precocious child replies, "No, you told me not to jump on the sofa, you
didn't tell me not to try to jump on the sofa. But all I managed to do was try."
She speaks the simple truth. But she still would deserve to lose out on ice
cream. In promising to penalize completion, we also, just like that, promise to
penalize attempt. And so it is in the law: typically, criminalization of attempts
is accomplished automatically through the criminalization of completion.2
There is an ordinary notion of trying that we take to be worthy of censure by
the state whenever completion is worthy of such censure. It can seem as though
we need not say what it is to attempt, for all that needs to be said is said already
in describing completion. In this respect, the logic of the law mirrors the logic
of everyday morality.
The point can be made in a different way. Imagine that you are asked why
it is a crime to attempt murder. In answer you will cite those features of com-
pleted murder that make it worthy of criminalization. Chances are, you won't
say a word about attempt at all. What this implies is that we take the features
of a form of completed action in virtue of which it is properly considered a
crime to somehow transfer to the attempt. We criminalize attempts under the
following principle, which I will call "The Transfer Principle": ifa form of con-
duct is legitimately criminalized, then so are attempts to engage in that form of con-
duct.
Under the Transfer Principle, the criminality of the completed crime
spreads only to attempts to perform that crime. The criminality of attempted
battery derives from the criminality of battery and not from the criminality of,
21. Of course, some statutes explicitly prohibit attempt as well as completion. E.g., D.C. CODE
ANN. § 22-303 (2006) (providing that "[w]hoever maliciously injures or breaks or destroys,
or attempts to injure or break or destroy... any public or private property" shall be punished)
(emphasis added). But this does not undermine the point. In such cases, there are two
sources of the criminalization of the attempt: the statute prohibiting the attempt and the




say, theft. The Transfer Principle supports criminalizing an attempt, then, only
if a description that applies to the attempt -words that correctly describe what
is attempted - is also an apt description of a kind of conduct that is legitimately
criminalized thanks to the fact that it meets that description.
So the Transfer Principle has an important implication, which tells us
where we should start in thinking about attempt. Determining what is proper-
ly criminalized as an attempt requires determining what ordinary notion of try-
ing is implicated in the Transfer Principle. In what sense of the term "try" is
trying to jump on the couch implicated in the proscription against jumping on
it? Or, to put the question in the legal context, in what sense of the term "try"
is trying to commit a crime implicated in the proscription against committing
it? In short, we need to know the necessary and sufficient conditions for trying
in the way that inherits criminality from that which one is trying to do.
B. The Wide and Narrow Senses of"Try"
We might think this problem is easy to solve: just appeal to our ordinary
notion of trying. We could then assess whether particular legal doctrines con-
cerning attempt sort defendants as they ought to do, by seeing whether our or-
dinary notion of trying sorts them in the same way. However, things are not so
simple. There are several "ordinary" notions of trying. In fact, a quick glance at
ordinary usage of the term "try" suggests that there are at least two senses of
the ordinary term that are different from the sense of relevance to the law. And
this leaves us wondering in what ordinary sense trying is implicitly prohibited
whenever we prohibit completion. We can see that these two ordinary concep-
tions of trying are inadequate to our task by seeing that trying, in those concep-
tions, sits uneasily with the Transfer Principle.
Under one ordinary usage of the term "try," what might be called the
"wide" sense of the term, anything that would be true of the person's act were
he to succeed in doing as he intends is part of what he is trying to do.' We par-
ticularly find this usage in cases of mistake. But to see this, start with an exam-
ple that does not involve mistake. Consider someone who is paid a sum to car-
ry a pound of white powder into the United States from abroad. He is quite
certain that the powder is cocaine, but he is not motivated by that fact. So long
as he gets paid, he does not care if the stuff is cocaine, or heroin, or talcum. Is
this person trying to smuggle cocaine? Or to put the same question another
way, does the phrase "to smuggle cocaine" correctly describe what this person
22. In his classic 1957 article, J.C. Smith claims that what I am calling the wide sense of trying is
the sense of relevance to the criminal law of attempts. See Smith, supra note 20. For the rea-
sons explained below, Smith is mistaken.
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is trying to do? In the wide sense of "try," this is an attempted cocaine smug-
gling not because of the person's state of knowledge, but because the stuff is
actually cocaine. It is an attempt to smuggle cocaine because if the intended
smuggling had come to pass, it would have been a smuggling of cocaine; and
this counterfactual is true because the stuff is actually cocaine. In this respect,
the wide sense of trying yields a result that is appropriate to the criminal law.
Conduct like that of this hypothetical person is of the sort implicitly prohibited
as an attempt to smuggle cocaine when cocaine smuggling is prohibited; the
Transfer Principle applies, and the wide sense of trying supports that result. So
far so good.
But the wide sense of "try" does not capture what we are after, as we can
see from considering other kinds of cases, particularly those involving mis-
takes. In the wide sense, a person who tries to take a suitcase that he reasonably
but falsely believes to be his own has attempted theft. Imagine, for instance,
that the suitcase looks exactly like his and happens to have his luggage tag,
with his name on it, attached to it. He reaches for the suitcase, acting on an in-
tention to take it, and is stopped by the suitcase's true owner, who explains
that the luggage tags were switched by mistake by the airline employees. It's a
simple mistake. Is it an attempted theft in the sense of relevance to criminal
law? Of course not. But it counts as such under the wide sense of "try," since
the following is true: were this person to have succeeded in taking the suitcase,
he would have taken something that was not his own.
The problem here is not only conflict with intuition about what should be
criminal. We can see this in part by noticing that, had the person in the exam-
ple just given been charged with the crime of attempted theft, he would have
been able to cite the fact that he did not know the suitcase was not his in his
defense, and such a defense would have succeeded. Such a person would never,
for this reason, be convicted of attempted theft. The problem is that under the
wide sense of trying, such a person would be speaking falsely were he to say, in
his defense, "I wasn't trying to take someone else's property." A person can re-
spond to an accusation either by showing that he did not do what he is accused
of having done, or by showing that, although he did it, he is not rightly pun-
ished for it (because it is justified, for instance, or because he was insane when
he did it). In the example just described, the first sort of response is appropri-
ate, but it is denied to the defendant under the wide sense of trying; under the
wide sense of trying, the defendant was trying to take someone else's property.
The problem is that such a person ought not to be understood as needing to
account for his behavior in light of the fact that completed theft is a crime; he
did not attempt theft in the sense in which the criminality of completed theft
transfers, and so he can admit that those who attempt theft need to account for
their behavior and simply deny that he is among them. Theft is criminal for
reasons that do not transfer to all wide attempts, and so the wide sense of at-
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tempt is not the one that informs the Transfer Principle, or the ordinary prac-
tice that shows the Transfer Principle to be implicit in everyday thought.
Under an alternative "narrow" conception of trying to act, also found in
ordinary language, what a person is trying to do is determined entirely by the
set of conditions that he is committed, by his intention, to promoting. The nar-
row conception has its appeal. Under it, the person who thinks the bag he tries
to take is his is not attempting theft, since he is in no sense committed by his
intention to making it more likely that the bag that he takes is not his; in fact,
he would have held back from trying to take the bag had he known it belonged
to someone else. But the narrow conception implies that the smuggler of white
powder who believes the stuff is cocaine, but does not care, is not attempting to
bring cocaine into the United States. After all, he is not committed to making it
more likely that cocaine should be smuggled. Were someone to convince him
that the stuff is talcum, he would still carry it because he is being paid to carry
it, no matter what it is. Something has gone wrong. The narrow conception of
trying to act cannot be the sense that informs criminal law; it provides too
stringent a standard for attempt. Put in the language of the Transfer Principle,
the criminality of the completed acts in cases of this sort transfers to the corre-
sponding attempts; the attempts were criminalized implicitly when we crimi-
nalized completion. But under the narrow conception of trying, these are not
attempts of the relevant completed crime. Still, there is some ordinary sense of
trying under which criminality does transfer in these cases. What follows is
that the narrow conception is not the sense of "trying" under which attempt is
criminalized.
C. Taking Stock
We are seeking an account of the kind of trying that is of relevance to the
criminal law of attempts. Our first step was to discover the Transfer Principle,
which arises naturally from the observation that in ordinary life the prohibition
of completion brings with it, intrinsically, the prohibition of some well-
defined, although not explicitly defined, class of failed efforts to engage in the
prohibited act. The same is true in the criminal law. Criminal attempts are all
and only those failed efforts that are implicitly criminalized when we criminal-
ize completion. We then started to look for the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for membership in that class. We found that neither the "wide" nor the
"narrow" sense of trying provided us with an adequate account of those condi-
tions. This leaves us, then, with a question: if it is neither the "wide" nor the
"narrow" sense, what sense of trying is of relevance to the criminal law? The
answer will be offered in Part III of this Article.
Before we provide the answer, we need to take a detour into the study of
the nature of intention. To see the need for it, notice that both the "wide" and
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the "narrow" senses of trying take intention to be crucial to trying. Part of what
it is to try is to intend. The two senses of trying grant different roles to inten-
tion in determining what a person is trying to do, but, still, intention is in both
cases crucial to trying. In fact, this is no accident, for in any ordinary sense of
trying, intention is essential. To identify a third ordinary sense of trying, we
need to identify a third possible role for intention to play in establishing what a
person is trying to do. But to do that, we need to know more about what an in-
tention is. So, progress on the problem of specifying the kind of trying that in-
herits its criminality from success -the kind of trying that matters to criminal
law-starts with reflection on the nature of intention.
II. INTENTION
A. The Rationally Constituted Nature of Intention
Intention is a distinctive state of mind. Intending an event is different from
believing it will occur, for instance. Most who believe that the sun will rise to-
morrow do not intend it to rise. Intending an event also differs from wanting it
to occur. Someone who wants to eat the chocolate cake for dessert may none-
theless intend to have no dessert at all. Intending differs also from wishing,
hoping, and anticipating. This is not to say that intending bears no relation-
ship to these other attitudes. Typically, for instance, those who intend particu-
lar events also believe that those events might occur. There is at least this close
connection between intention and belief, and there will be similar connections
of many different sorts between intention and desire, intention and wish, and
so on. But, still, intentions are different from these other mental states.
It is a project in philosophy of mind to determine how intention differs
from these other mental states. The project is to specify the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions that must be met for a person to intend a particular event or
condition, including but not limited to the event of performing a particular ac-
tion.23 It is a closely related project in the philosophy of law to identify the nec-
23. See, e.g., G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION (1957); MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, FACES OF INTEN-
TION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION AND AGENCY (1999) [hereinafter BRATMAN, FACES];
MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASONING (1987) [hereinafter
BRATMAN, INTENTION]; MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, STRUCTURES OF AGENCY (2007) [hereinafter
BRATMAN, STRUCTURES]; JOHN BROOME, RATIONALITY THROUGH REASONING (2013); Don-
ald Davidson, Intending, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 83 (2001); GILBERT HARMAN,
CHANGE IN VIEW: PRINCIPLES OF REASONING (1986); ALFRED MELE, SPRINGS OF ACTION:
UNDERSTANDING INTENTIONAL BEHAVIOR (1992); KIERAN SETIYA, REASONS WITHOUT RA-
TIONALISM (2007); Donald Davidson, Actions, Reasons and Causes, 60 J. PHIL. 685 (1963);
Wayne A. Davis, A Causal Theory of Intending, 21 AM. PHIL. Q-43 (1984); H. Paul Grice, In-
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essary and sufficient conditions that must be met for a person to intend a par-
ticular event or condition in the sense of relevance to intentional torts, or in the sense
of relevance to formation in contract, or in the sense of relevance to intentional dis-
crimination, or in the sense of relevance to criminal responsibility. However, it is a
hypothesis worth exploring that all of the various senses of the legal term "in-
tention" circle around a core notion that has its natural home in ordinary dis-
course.' The law is better when it uses ordinary terms in ordinary ways and
employs concepts that bear a close resemblance to those used in everyday life
by citizens asked to conform their behavior to law. It is the core notion of in-
tention that has been investigated by philosophers of mind and action. If in-
deed such a core notion informs the law, then it is important for those interest-
ed in criminal responsibility to understand what philosophers of mind have
discovered about the nature of intention.
As a first step, consider the following example. A shopper goes to the store,
equipped with a list of things to buy. He has a limited budget, so while he
needs everything on his list, he also cannot buy more than is on his list. He
walks around filling his cart. Meanwhile, a spy follows him and writes down
everything that the shopper puts in the cart. At the end of the trip, both the
shopper and the spy have a list that matches the world: both of their lists corre-
spond to the contents of the cart. These two lists, however, had very different
functions. The shopper's list functioned to make the world match it; the spy's
list functioned to match the world as it came to be. Were a third party to re-
move eggs from the cart, the fact that the shopper's list includes eggs ought to
lead him to fix the situation by putting more eggs in his cart; he should change
the world to match his list. By contrast, the fact that the spy's list includes eggs
(he wrote that down before the third party removed them) ought to lead him
to cross it off his list; he ought to change the list to match the world. The
shopper's list is like an intention, the spy's like a belief.2' Intrinsically, both
consist in nothing but a representation of the world. But they have different
functions.
What this example suggests is that the right way to inquire about how in-
tention differs from other mental states is to reflect on the distinctive-functional
role of intention. What are intentions for? What do they help us to do that oth-
tention and Uncertainty, 57 PROC. BRITISH ACAD. 263 (1971); Gilbert Harman, Practical Rea-
soning, 29 REV. METAPHYSICS 431 (1976).
24. Legal scholarship is replete with examples of studies of the relationship between ordinary
notions and their corresponding legal manifestations. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & GREGORY
KLAAS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT (2005); MICHAEL S.
MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS
(2009); PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT (2004).
25. The example is G.E.M. Anscombe's. See ANSCOMBE, supra note 23, at 56.
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er mental states, such as beliefs, desires, hopes, or wishes, do not help us to do?
We should expect that together with an account of the functional role of inten-
tion will come an account of principles of rationality governing those who have
intentions. If we know what intentions are for, we will also have some idea of
what kinds of things a rational agent who has an intention will do, or what
kinds of other attitudes, including beliefs and other intentions, he will have.
This matters for our purposes here, recall, because we are seeking an account of
the notion of trying that is implicitly criminalized when we criminalize com-
pleted conduct like murder or rape. Since trying necessarily involves intending,
the task of understanding attempt law and describing how it ought to be struc-
tured necessarily requires an account of what it is to intend. Therefore, we need
to know what distinctive roles intentions play in guiding reasoning behavior in
contrast to other mental states that are not essential ingredients of trying.
Michael Bratman's important work on intention, which he began publish-
ing in the 198os, provides a great deal of insight about the functional role of
intention and the associated norms of rationality that govern those who in-
tend., 6 Under what Bratman calls "the planning theory of intention," inten-
tion's function is to make the world as intended and to make that happen in a way
that allows agents to efficiently achieve long-term goals.7 So, for instance, it is part
of an intention's role to provide for coordination between one's self at one time
and one's self at another. The person who intends in the morning to cook spa-
ghetti for dinner will not succeed in doing as he intends unless his midday self
helps by stopping at the store for spaghetti. His intention prompts such help
by leading the midday self to do just that.
In this example, the intention plays its role by prompting the formation of
intentions to undertake necessary means, but often an intention plays its role
by instead preventing the agent from acting in a particular way. Deliberation,
for instance, is a costly activity. When deciding this morning what to have for
dinner, the agent has to focus his energies on thinking that through instead of
doing a variety of other things, and he might have to collect information, such
as information about who will be joining him for dinner or about what time he
will be free to start cooking. This expensive deliberative process culminates in
the formation of the intention to have spaghetti. The intention, in turn, func-
tions to cut off later deliberation about what to have for dinner in the absence
of new information. It is because the intention settles the question of what to
26. A number of legal theorists have used Bratman's work to their advantage. See, e.g., Scorr J.
SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Intention, 29 CARDozo L. REv.
1147 (2007); Gideon Yaffe, Conditional Intent and Mens Rea, lo LEGAL THEORY 273 (2004).
27. BRATMAN, FACES, supra note 23; BRATMAN, INTENTION, supra note 23; BRATMAN, STRuc-
TURES, supra note 23.
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have for dinner that at midday the agent heads straight for the spaghetti aisle
rather than rethinking the question of what to buy at the store.
Plans play various roles in making possible and effective organized behav-
ior that takes place over extended periods of time. Reflection on these roles
leads to the articulation of several norms of rationality that govern those with
intentions. If an agent is rational, then nothing about him will defeat his inten-
tions from functioning as they ought or performing their distinctive roles. A
fully rational agent who intends to do something, for instance, will not intend
to do acts incompatible with completing necessary means to doing as intended.
A fully rational agent who intends to do something will not at the same time
believe with certainty that he will fail to do as intended. We can argue over the
details of how to formulate the relevant norms of rationality governing those
who intend. But our purposes here will not require settling such arguments.
Intrinsically, an intention is just like any other mental state that depicts a fu-
ture state of the world, such as a future state of one's body. What distinguishes
intentions from other such representations are the norms of rationality under
which a person labors thanks to what the intention is for. An intention places
an agent under rational pressures; he must conform to certain requirements of
coherence among his intentions, other mental states, and conduct on pain of
irrationality.
The intention's primary function is to make the world as it depicts the
world, so as to further the agent's goals. If the intention is to play that role suc-
cessfully, then the agent must not defeat it by constructing conflicting plans or
by failing to undertake means to its fulfillment. There are many ways to fail to
live up to one's intentions. The basic insight, however, is that many such fail-
ures amount to falling short of certain norms of rationality -norms that apply
to the agent because he has an intention to act in a particular way.
B. Intention-Based Commitments and Responsibility
There are two interrelated and important points about the insight that in-
tention is characterized and distinguished from other mental states by the
norms of rationality that govern those who have intentions. First, the position
sits comfortably with a particular sense in which to intend something is to be
committed to it. In what is, perhaps, the paradigm case, to be committed to
something is not just to have a reason to promote it; that reason must be spe-
cial to oneself and, in many cases, will derive from one's own will. We all have
a reason to promote world peace, but only some of us are committed to it.
Those who are have a reason to promote it that derives from the fact that they
have chosen to promote it or have devoted themselves to its promotion. Hav-
ing such a reason involves, undoubtedly among other things, rational pressure
to deliberate in certain distinctive ways. A rational person, committed to world
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peace, is under pressure at least to consider the fact that a particular company
provides support to an ongoing war when deciding whether to buy that com-
pany's products. Furthermore, such a person is under pressure at least to grant
some weight to that consideration when deliberating about what to do.
In fact, these are two forms of rational pressure that we are under when we
intend to act. A cashier who intends to steal from his employer faces distinctive
rational pressure with respect to both the facts he considers and the weight to
give those facts when he deliberates about what to do. In considering whether
to under-report the day's sales, he ought, rationally, to consider the fact that by
doing so he increases his chances of stealing from his employer. He may decide
not to do it- maybe he has another, better plan for stealing- but, still, he is not
fully rational if he does not grant that consideration some weight in his delib-
erations (provided that it occurs to him that it will help him to commit the in-
tended theft, and provided that he does not give up his intention). In short, to
intend is to structure one's own rationality. It is to generate reasons for one-
self- reasons that do not apply to others. And this is the key to understanding
the sense in which agents are committed to that which they intend. The cash-
ier's intention commits him to stealing from his employer; what that means is
that he has special self-generated reasons to structure his practical reasoning
around stealing. The view of intention under discussion here, that is, has pro-
vided more precision to the idea that our intentions commit us to what they
depict.
The role of intentions in constituting commitments explains, also, why in-
tention is of such paramount importance to culpability and criminal responsi-
bility. What a person intends tells us a great deal about what kinds of consider-
ations he recognizes as giving him reason, and about how he weighs those
considerations in his deliberations about what to do. In fact, it is in part consti-
tutive of those facts. Someone who intends to steal from his employer takes the
fact that the contents of the cash drawer are not his as either providing him with
no reason not to take those contents, or as providing a reason of insufficient
significance to outweigh considerations in favor of stealing. These facts about
the person's modes of recognition and response to reasons are of crucial im-
portance to assessing his responsibility. It is partly because of those facts that
he deserves censure for the act of taking what is not his; they sit at the root of
his culpability. He deserves censure not merely because his employer suffers at
his hand-although that is, of course, significant-but also because he has
misused, misdirected, his capacities for the recognition and response to rea-
sons, capacities that are distinctive of moral agents.78
z8. For views of the nature of responsibility that are supportive of this point, see, for instance,
JOHN MARTN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: A THEORY OF
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Intention, norms of rationality, commitment, and modes of recognition
and response to reasons constitute a family of intertwined notions bearing deep
and important relations to culpability and criminal responsibility. These no-
tions are at the heart of what is distinctive about human agency. They are at the
heart of what we respond to in others when we judge them to be blameworthy
for wrongdoing, both in and out of criminal law contexts. Our resentment and
outrage when confronted with another's wrongdoing, not to mention our guilt
and remorse when confronted with our own, is a response to corruption in the
way the actor recognized and responded to reasons and thereby guided his
conduct. Part of what we are outraged about is that the actor does not care that
the property he took was not his, or cared insufficiently about the fact that an-
other would be harmed by his act, or cared too much about lining his own
pockets. The actor's intentions and commitments are of particular importance
because they are inextricably connected with modes of recognition and re-
sponse to reasons, but also because there is a meaningful sense in which modes
of recognition and response to reasons that have their source in intention and
commitment are self-inflicted; they have their source in the agent's will.
C. Broadening Our Perspective on Intention-Based Commitments
The theory of the nature of criminal attempt being developed in this Article
began with the appealing idea that attempts are those failures that are implicit-
ly criminalized when we criminalize completion; they are those that support
the Transfer Principle. The observation that all forms of trying include inten-
tion launched an account of the nature of intention. This account, derived from
Michael Bratman's work, was shown to have an important, albeit abstract, im-
plication for our understanding of criminal responsibility: intentions constitute
commitments to the conditions they depict by generating special reasons for
the intending agent to structure his practical reasoning around those condi-
tions. Because the intending killer's intention depicts another's death, he is un-
der rational pressure to ignore options incompatible with the other's death,
and to form intentions to take means, among other rational pressures. This
tells us something of great significance to the assessment of his criminal re-
sponsibility, for it tells us how he employs and directs his distinctive human
capacity for self-consciously recognizing and responding to reasons.
But this is not all that needs to be said about the nature of intention if we
are to develop an adequate account of what it is to try to act -an account that
ought to, and sometimes does, inform the law governing criminal attempt. We
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1998); SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN REASON (1990); and T.M.
Scanlon, The Significance of Choice, in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 151 (1986).
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cannot just take what philosophers of action have said and apply it; we need to
go beyond what has been discerned about the nature of intention by Bratman;
we need to make further philosophical progress. In particular, more needs to
be said about the range of commitments that are constituted by our intentions.
Reflection on the issue demonstrates that there are at least three different kinds
of commitment that one can have to an event, such as an element of a crime,
thanks to the fact that one has a particular intention. As we will see, all three
kinds of commitment turn out to be important to the proper adjudication of
criminal attempts.
In the typical case-so typical, in fact, as to blind us to the existence of
atypical cases - someone who intends a particular condition is thereby commit-
ted to increasing the likelihood that the world should be in that condition. The
effort to live up to this commitment often manifests itself in "tracking" behav-
ior. To engage in "tracking" behavior is to respond to obstacles to the realiza-
tion of an intended condition by taking steps that sidestep or weaken the ob-
stacles' effect. So, for instance, a person who intends to prevent another from
leaving a room will not just lock the door, but will also respond, if he can,
when the prisoner picks the lock; perhaps he will then throw the deadbolt, or
push the prisoner back into the room, or call in reinforcements, or take some
other act that will correct for the facts that are defeating or threatening to de-
feat the world from matching his intention. In fact, he is under rational pressure
to "track" the condition in this way: to fail to do so, absent some further rea-
son, would be irrational. Such rational pressures constitute the commitment to
the condition. Since the pressures in question are pressures to take steps to im-
prove the chances of the condition's coming to be, call this a commitment of
promotion.
It is very tempting to say that all intention-based commitments to condi-
tions are commitments of promotion. In fact, virtually everyone who has writ-
ten about intention has assumed this, usually implicitly.2 9 Bratman, for in-
stance, insists that among the distinctive norms governing those who intend
are norms of "means-end coherence" that place intending agents under norma-
tive pressure to intend acts that they believe to be necessary to fulfill their in-
tentions.30 And, to be sure, there are such pressures wherever there are inten-
tion-based commitments of promotion; rationality requires us to intend
necessary means to an event's occurrence whenever we are committed to in-
creasing the likelihood of that event's coming to pass. In assuming that norms
29. An exception, arguably, is Hector Neri-Castaneda, whose work deserves to receive much
more attention from philosophers of action. For a start, see his article Intentions and the
Structure of Intending, 68 J. PHIL. 453 (1971).
30. BRATMAN, INTENTION, supra note 23, at 31.
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of means-end coherence apply to intending agents no matter what they intend,
Bratman is assuming that every time a person intends an event he thereby in-
curs a commitment of promotion with respect to that event.
But the assumption is false. Say that I intend to go running at 9:oo AM. As
I'm about to start running, I notice a clock that says it's 8:oo AM; I had forgot-
ten that the time changed as a result of the end of daylight saving time. I go
running anyway, and I'm done by 8:30. Did I do what I intended to do? Well, I
went running, as intended. But I didn't go running at 9:oo AM, which was part
of what I intended. On the one hand, then, it does seem that I did all that I was
committed by my intention to promoting; there's no real sense in which I fell
short of my goals. On the other hand, however, there is still a meaningful sense
in which the world did not match my intention; to fully match my intention, I
would have had to run at 9:oo AM, not 8:oo. The result: included in the con-
tent of my intention was the condition that I run at 9:oo AM. But despite its
inclusion in the content of my intention, that condition is not one that I in-
curred any commitment to promote.
Who cares? As will be demonstrated below, we should care; that is, we who
care about criminal responsibility and the mental states required for it should
care about this. But a first step to seeing why this matters is to see that our in-
tentions commit us, in a sense now to be described, to intended conditions even
when we lack commitments to promote those conditions.
Say that when I am getting ready to run, I see that it is, indeed, 9:oo AM.
But I change my mind and decide not to run. When asked why I changed my
mind, I say, "Well, it's 9:oo AM." Something has gone wrong. I can reconsider
my intention for many good reasons: I remember a pressing 9:15 appointment,
the hills are steeper than expected, it starts to rain, there are too many dogs
around, etc. If I did not intend to run at 9:oo AM, I could even reconsider in
light of the fact that it is 9:oo AM-maybe I think it is too late in the morning
to run. What I cannot do in full rationality is reconsider for that reason given
that that was part of what I intended in the first place. The fact that the condi-
tion is included in the content of my intention, then, places me under a very
particular form of rational pressure: it places me under pressure not to reconsider
the intention in light of the fact that the condition is met. Call this a commit-
ment of non-reconsideration. As the example illustrates, it is possible to have an
intention-based commitment of non-reconsideration with respect to a particular
condition without having a commitment to promote the condition.
There is yet another kind of intention-based commitment that one can have
to a condition in the absence of a commitment of promotion with respect to the
condition. Imagine that, acting on my intention to go running at 9:oo AM, I
go running and so I fail to call a friend whom I promised to call at 9:oo AM.
The friend complains. I respond, "You can't blame me that it was 9:oo AM
when I was running. I would have been happy to run at 8:oo." In making this
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remark, my goal is to show my friend that the condition thanks to which I
failed her-namely that I was running at 9:oo rather than 8:oo-was not some-
thing that I was committed to promoting. The claim is that since I was not
committed to promoting that fact, it is not something in light of which I can be
held responsible. But, given that I intended to run at 9:oo AM, my friend will
see my remarks, quite rightly, as providing no reason to temper her censure.
Given that I intended to run at 9:oo AM, I can't shield myself from responsibil-
ity by pointing out that I was not committed to promoting that fact. At least, I
cannot do so rationally. The condition that accounts for my harming my friend
is also one that matches the content of my intention, and so it is not an unin-
tended condition for which I bear no responsibility. Thanks to my intention,
that is, I have incurred a particular commitment to the condition that it is 9:oo
AM when I run. Call this a commitment of non-complaint. A person cannot ra-
tionally complain that the world turns out the way he intended it to be. More
precisely, a very particular kind of complaint is silenced, namely the complaint
that might be expressed by saying, "That's not what I intended." Even if it were
not something that he was committed to promoting, it would still be some-
thing that he intended and so something that he would be committed to not
complaining about when it came to pass. Commitments of non-complaint are
commitments to acquiesce in the world's turning out a certain way-a form of
acquiescence that precludes us from pointing to the absence of a commitment
to promote that condition in justifying our behavior.
D. Taking Stock
This Part began with Bratman's two-part discovery about the nature of in-
tention: intentions serve distinctive needs in coordinating our behavior over
time, and as a result, those who have intentions are under distinctive rational
pressures with respect to their behavior and their other mental states. To fail to
conform to those pressures is to interfere with the proper functioning of inten-
tion. It is these special roles and accompanying rational pressures that distin-
guish intentions from other mental states. This is also the sense in which inten-
tions constitute commitments to that which they depict: when a condition is
depicted by one's intention, then rationality requires various things of a person
in light of the presence or absence of that condition. That's what it is to be
committed by one's intention to the condition.
These observations then prompted a further and more probing examina-
tion of varieties of commitment constituted by an intention, varying in what,
exactly, rationality requires of you in light of the presence or absence of a con-
dition depicted by your intention. What we found was that in addition to the
familiar commitments of promotion-in many cases, a depicted condition is
one that the agent is rationally committed to taking steps to promote-there
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are commitments of non-reconsideration and non-complaint where rationality
requires other things of intending agents, things that fall short of promoting
the depicted condition.
This raises the question asked already: why should we care? Why should
we think that subtleties about the differences between the kinds of commit-
ments engendered by our intentions matter to criminal responsibility? The an-
swer, as we will see in Part III, is that recognizing these subtle differences al-
lows us to formulate, with a certain degree of rigor, an account of the kind of
trying that is implicitly prohibited when we prohibit success. It allows us, that
is, to develop a principled account of what a criminal attempt is. And once we
are armed with such an account, we will be able to go on, in Parts IV, V, and
VI, to make concrete recommendations for how the courts should resolve diffi-
cult problems arising in the adjudication of attempts.
III. THE LEGALLY RELEVANT SENSE OF "TRY"
A. The Guiding Commitment View
At the end of Part I, I argued that neither of two ordinary senses of "trying"
aligns precisely with the sense of trying that we prohibit in the law of criminal
attempts. The "wide" sense, under which anything that would be true of your
act were you to do as you intend contributes to what you are trying to do, is too
wide; too much is criminalized as attempt under that conception. The "nar-
row" sense, under which only that which you are committed by your intention
to promoting contributes to what you are trying to do, is too narrow; much that
ought to be criminalized as attempt under that conception is not so criminal-
ized. I then promised that further reflection on the nature of intention would
allow us to articulate the necessary and sufficient conditions of trying in the
sense that is consistent with, and supports, the Transfer Principle. Now that
we have a view of the nature of intention in hand, I am in a position to fulfill
that promise.
Despite its problems, the narrow sense of trying gets something right:
what a person tries to do, in the sense of relevance to criminal law, is a function
of what he is committed to by the intention on which he is acting. But to limit
the range of relevant conditions to those that we have an intention-based
commitment to promoting is to overlook the other ways, discussed in Part II, in
which our intentions can commit us to particular conditions. This is the key to
understanding the sense of trying that is relevant to the criminal law. To try to
act, in the sense of relevance to the criminal law, is to have an intention that commits
one (in one of the three senses of intention-based commitment) to each of the condi-
tions involved in completion, and for one's behavior to be guided by that intention. I
call this the "Guiding Commitment View" of attempt.
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Under the Guiding Commitment View, to use an example from Part I, a
defendant who attempts to take a bag that he falsely but reasonably believes to
be his own has not attempted theft under the Guiding Commitment View. His
intention does not commit him, in any sense, to the bag's belonging to some-
one else. This condition is not depicted by his intention, and so he incurs no
intention-based commitment to it. As we will see in Part V, the Guiding Com-
mitment View, in contrast to the narrow view of trying, also implies that the
person who believes the white powder is cocaine, but would transport it even if
it were heroin or talcum, and tries to transport it across the border, has at-
tempted to smuggle cocaine. So, in contrast to the wide and the narrow senses
of trying, the Guiding Commitment View provides us with a way of conceptu-
alizing these examples that is consistent with the Transfer Principle. As we will
see in Parts IV, V, and VI, the Transfer Principle and the Guiding Commitment
View also provide us with defensible and independently plausible resolutions
of a variety of difficult problems of adjudication.
B. Guidance and "Mere Preparation"
It is important to emphasize that there are two parts to trying under the
Guiding Commitment View: intention-based commitment and behavior guid-
ed by intention. Much has been said already here about intention-based com-
mitment, but a bit more needs to be said about guidance. To be guided by an
intention is to be moved or motivated by it to do that which is intended. To be
motivated by an intention is for it to be the case that the causal sequence initi-
ated by the intention would culminate in the world coming to match the inten-
tion, were obstacles removed and were the agent not to change his mind.
There is more in this brief account of guidance than meets the eye. The ac-
count involves a particular view of how motivation differs from other causal
influences of intention. A person intends to climb the stairs. This intention
causes two things: it causes him to announce "I will ascend the staircase!" and
it causes him to take the first step. The intention motivates the taking of the
first step but does not motivate the pronouncement. In making the pronounce-
ment, he is instead motivated by an intention to tell the world of his plans. If
you ask him why he took the first step, a sufficient answer is, "Because I in-
tended to climb the stairs." But if you ask him why he made his pronounce-
ment, that answer will not suffice. Making the pronouncement in no way con-
tributes to ascending the stairs, nor does he think it will. It is not rational or
worth doing thanks to its contribution to that endeavor, while taking the first
step is. But how do we distinguish the two causal influences of the intention to
climb the staircase? The intention to climb the staircase does cause the pro-
nouncement; he wouldn't make the pronouncement if he did not have that in-
tention. So why is the intention's influence on the one form of behavior (the
124:92 201 4
CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS
first step) motivational, but not on the other (the pronouncement)? The best
we can do in answer is to note that were the causal sequence leading to the first
step to continue without obstacles and without change of mind, the agent
would climb the stairs. The same is not true of the causal sequence leading to
the pronouncement. That causal sequence will culminate instead in his inform-
ing the world of his plans. Therefore, the right way to determine whether the
influence of a person's intention on his behavior is motivational, and so is an
instance of guidance, is to ask the following question: had he the ability and
opportunity to act, and did not change his mind, would the causal sequence in
question have culminated in the intended action?
Efforts on the parts of courts and legislators to concoct "tests" for the act
element of attempt can be construed as efforts to describe acts that provide suf-
ficient evidence of motivational influence by intention. They are efforts to iden-
tify conduct from which it is safe to infer that the defendant's intention was
having a causal influence on his behavior of a sort that would culminate in
commission of the crime in the absence of obstacles. The driving issue, that is,
is whether the defendant's acts provide sufficient evidence of guidance by the
intention. Reflection on the notion of "proximity" animating Oliver Wendell
Holmes's influential "dangerous proximity test" leads to this conclusion.3' Ac-
cording to Holmes, the defendant's act suffices for the act element of attempt if
and only if it brought him into dangerous proximity to completion of the
crime. But the only coherent and normatively defensible conception of "prox-
imity" in this domain is counterfactual: the defendant's act is in "dangerous
proximity" to completion if and only if all that needs to be added to get com-
pletion is ability, opportunity, and absence of change of mind. What Holmes
really wanted to know was whether things had gone so far as to convince us
that failure could only be attributed to the fortuitous occurrence of obstacles
that defeated ability or opportunity, or prompted the defendant to change his
mind. The dangerous proximity test, that is, is implicitly motivated by some-
thing very close to the Guiding Commitment View itself.
Demonstrating that all the various tests for the act element of attempt are
either indefensible, or amount to efforts to capture this idea, requires looking
at the details of all the tests that have been offered, and not just one. For our
purposes here, however, it suffices to note that the frustrating imprecision that
is necessarily involved in this approach-under what conditions, exactly, is the
relevant counterfactual true? -cannot be overcome for principled reasons. Since
to try, in the sense of relevance to criminal law, is to be guided by an intention
that commits one to success, the best characterization of the act element of an
attempt will be an account of what it is to be guided by such an intention. It is
31. HOLMES, supra note 20, at 68-69.
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highly unlikely that we can do better in distinguishing guidance from other in-
fluences of intention on behavior than to ask what would happen in the ab-
sence of obstacles or change of mind. Like it or not, that's the question we have
to answer to determine if the defendant's conduct suffices for attempt.
C. Neither "Subjectivism" nor "Objectivism"
The Guiding Commitment View preserves exactly the idea we find in ordi-
nary moral thought -an idea expressed in the Transfer Principle. We justify
criminalizing an attempt to commit a crime by citing the features of the very
crime attempted. We do not justify criminalizing an attempt to do one thing by
citing the features of something other than what was attempted in explanation. So,
we need an account of trying to act that preserves this tight connection. We
need an account that allows us to identify the attempt in the way that exhibits
congruity between it and completion. The Guiding Commitment View serves
the turn. It identifies the sense of trying that is relevant to criminal law.
The truth about attempts has eluded theorists of criminal law precisely be-
cause they start in the wrong places. They do not start with the question of
what kind of failure, what kind of trying, we have implicitly prohibited in our
prohibitions of success. As indicated earlier, subjectivists start with the idea
that attempts are thought crimes involving some special species of thoughts
that it is acceptable to criminalize (such as resolute intentions). Objectivists start
with the idea that attempts are crimes involving actions that approximate, or
bear some close relation to, harmful conduct of the sort that we typically crimi-
nalize (such as conduct that is "proximate" to completion, or that imposes a se-
rious risk of completion).
What subjectivist and objectivist approaches share is the belief that the first
and most natural description of the conduct involved in a criminal attempt is a
description under which it is not in any sense wrongful. "All he did," we say,
"was light a match. What could be criminal about that?" The subjectivist em-
braces the claim that the act is not in itself wrongful and concludes that the
criminality of the attempt must derive from the accompanying mental state; all
he did was light a match, but he lit it with the intention of burning down another's
house. The objectivist, by contrast, seeks an alternative description of the act
under which it is wrongful in explanation of the attempt's criminality; he did
not merely light a match, he imposed a serious risk that another's house would burn
down. The problem with both approaches is that the first and most natural de-
scription of the act is a description under which it is wrongful. The act is the act
of trying to burn down another's house, or trying to have sex with a minor, or
trying to bring drugs across the border. These are wrongful, prohibited behav-
iors; they were prohibited when we prohibited burning down another's house,
having sex with a minor, and bringing drugs across the border. Trying was
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prohibited when success was prohibited. The place to start in thinking about
attempts is with an effort to identify this kind of trying. And, as we have seen,
this leads to the Guiding Commitment View.
In fact, something in the nature of the conceptualization of criminal behav-
ior endemic to criminal law and its practice gives rise to the error shared by
subjectivists and objectivists alike. It is because criminal law practitioners and
theorists insist on dividing crimes into actus reus and mens rea components
that they have overlooked the right way to start thinking about attempts.
The reason is that implicit in the divide is the thought that the actus reus
and mens rea components of crimes make independent contributions to the
criminality of the conduct. This independence idea prompts the thought that
we should be able to explain the contribution to criminality of the actus reus
without making any reference to the mens rea. Often this is indeed the case.
Burning another's property is morally salient; it is something one needs to an-
swer for. Intending to burn another's property is also morally salient. When we
put these two things together, there is crime. In this case, the act has features
that make it morally salient independently of the mental states that gave rise to
it: someone's property, after all, was burned; someone's legally protected in-
terests were invaded. And so in the case of completed arson, it is both useful
and clarifying to specify the actus reus and the mens rea as distinct and concep-
tually separate conditions. But if we assume that this is true of all crimes, then
we quickly find ourselves on the road to either subjectivism or objectivism, for
the truth is that many an attempted crime is not wrongful under any descrip-
tion that applies to it independently of the mental states that gave rise to it.
The conduct in question is wrongful alright, but only under descriptions that
are not mens rea-independent, namely descriptions that specifically identify the
fact that the conduct is a trying. To describe the act as trying to burn another's
property is to describe it in a way that implicates and refers to the mental state
that gave rise to it, namely an intention that committed the actor to each of the
features of completed arson. Given that students of criminal law are taught to
characterize actus reus and mens rea independently, it is no wonder that theo-
rists take the central puzzle about attempt to derive from the thought that it in-
volves conduct that is not on its face wrongful; they have been taught to attach
a description to the act that leaves out exactly that in virtue of which it is
wrongful, namely that it is an instance of trying to do something wrongful. The
tidy conceptualization of crimes as consisting of distinct actus reus and mens
rea elements, useful and illuminating as it is for understanding the structure of
most, if not all, completed crimes, misleads when it comes to attempt.
When we avoid the error of assuming that actus reus and mens rea make
independent contributions to the criminality of the behavior they constitute,
we find ourselves on the middle way. After all, if a defendant fires a gun and
misses, and if the criminality of his action emerges from the fact that the actus
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reus and mens rea together constitute the defendant's trying to kill, then we
need to know in what sense of "trying" this is true. The answer is that it is true
in the sense of trying that is implicitly criminalized when we criminalize com-
pleted homicide or any other completed crime. From here we find ourselves
with the Guiding Commitment View, for this view identifies all and only the
failures that are implicitly prohibited when we prohibit success. Further down
this road, as we will see in the next three sections, lie solutions to many diffi-
cult problems encountered by those tasked with adjudicating attempted
crimes.
D. Taking Stock
Acting on the hunch that adjudicatory problems about attempt can be
solved by a defensible theory of what an attempt is, we were led to an account
of the criminalization of attempt, namely the Transfer Principle. Acceptance of
the Transfer Principle allowed us to formulate the question of what an attempt
is in a way that made it tractable. That became a question about what sorts of
tryings are implicitly prohibited when we prohibit success. Reflection on that
question first led us to an account of intention as a source of a range of com-
mitments to those conditions that are depicted by the intention. And this ac-
count led us, in turn, to an account of trying, namely the Guiding Commit-
ment View, according to which to try to commit a particular crime is to have an
intention that commits one to all of those conditions involved in completion of
the crime, and to be guided by that intention. It is in that sense of trying that
trying is implicitly criminalized when we criminalize completion.
In difficult attempt cases, what the defendant did -or even what mental
state he did it with -is not in dispute. What is in dispute is whether what he
did constituted an attempt of the sort he is accused of having committed. The
Guiding Commitment View provides just what the inquiry needs: an account
of the necessary and sufficient conditions that are met when a person has in-
deed committed an attempt, in the sense of "attempt" that matters to criminal
law. This should make us optimistic that the Guiding Commitment View can
help us with our adjudicatory problems. It is to those that we now turn.
IV. TRYING BY ASKING: SOLICITATION AS ATTEMPT
Return to Ronald Decker, who, thinking he was dealing with a hitman,
paid an undercover detective to kill his sister, and who, fighting for something
less than a life sentence, argued that while his solicitation was admittedly a
crime, it did not amount to an attempt. In 2007, the Supreme Court of Califor-
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nia announced that Decker was, in fact, attempting to murder his sister.3 In
making this announcement, the court overturned a case from the 1970s, People
v. Adami,33 another case in which the defendant paid an undercover police of-
ficer to kill someone but in which the court ruled that a solicitation did not
amount to an attempt. In fact, there is no standard view across jurisdictions on
the matter. Pay someone to kill in Idaho, Nevada, or South Dakota, for in-
stance, and you've committed only the lesser crime of solicitation;' pay some-
one to kill in Georgia, Iowa, New York, or Ohio, and you've attempted the
murder.3" We find even greater variation when we consider crimes other than
murder. If you ask a child for oral sex, have you attempted sexual battery? 6 If
you ask a minister to marry you to your niece, have you tried to marry someone
incestuously?37 If you ask someone to bribe a witness, have you attempted to
bribe a witness ?,8 If you ask someone to burn down a barn, have you attempt-
ed arson? 9 Courts regularly have to answer questions like this. They answer
them differently in different places and in different times, and they give differ-
ent answers when different crimes are involved.4" In fairness to the courts, it is
not easy. The issue stands at the intersection of three independently thorny
parts of the criminal law: attempt, solicitation, and complicity, and if we aren't
careful, we find ourselves embroiled in all but intractable questions about
32. People v. Superior Court, 157 P. 3d 1017, 1019 (Cal. 2007). More precisely, the court reached
the conclusion that a reasonable jury could so find and so held that a solicitation like Deck-
er's could be an attempt under California law. Id. at 1022.
33. 111 Cal. Rptr. 544 (Ct. App. 1973).
34. People v. Otto, 629 P.2d 646 (Idaho 1981); Commonwealth v. Hamel, 752 N.E.2d 8o8
(Mass. App. Ct. 2001); Johnson v. Sherriff, 532 P.2d 1037 (Nev. 1975); State v. Disanto, 688
N.W.2d 201 (S.D. 2004).
35. Howell v. State, 278 S.E.2d 43 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Leggio, 781 N.W.2d loo (Iowa
Ct. App. 2010); People v. Sabo, 687 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup. Ct. 1998); State v. Group, 781
N.E.2d 980 (Ohio 2002).
36. In State v. Arave, 268 P.3d 163 (Utah 2o11), such a solicitation was taken to be insufficient for
attempt, while in Ishee v. State, 799 So. 2d 70 (Miss. 2001), an attempt conviction on similar
facts was upheld.
37. See People v. Murray, 14 Cal. 159 (1859) (holding that the evidence did not sustain a convic-
tion for attempt).
38. See State v. Bailer, 26 W. Va. 90 (1885) (holding that the request did not amount to an at-
tempt despite the fact that money was given for the bribe).
39. In State v. Taylor, 84 P. 82 (Or. 19o6), soliciting someone to burn down a barn was attempt-
ed arson, while in State v. Donovan, 90 A. 220 (Del. 1914), soliciting someone to burn down
a warehouse was not.
40. See State v. Sunzar, 751 A.2d 627 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1999) (ruling that it was an at-
tempt to ask someone to move hazardous waste).
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causation as well.4'
The Guiding Commitment View can help us to identify the crucial ques-
tions that need to be answered in order to provide a principled solution to the
problems faced by courts. The solution proposed here is as follows: in the most
difficult cases, if the defendant has asked another person to bring about an
event that is a result element of the completed crime, then the defendant may
have thereby attempted the crime; if, however, the event that the defendant has
asked another person to bring about figures into the definition of an act ele-
ment of the completed crime, then the defendant has not attempted through
his solicitation. Thus, a distinction that seems to be merely formal-the dis-
tinction between act elements and result elements of crimes - turns out to be of
substantive importance.
A. The Insufficiency ofAccomplice Liability
The Decker case, and many others like it, defies resolution through appeal
to doctrines concerned with complicity, and this is part of the reason why
courts like the Adami court have concluded that such cases do not involve at-
tempt. Had Holston attempted the murder that Decker asked him to commit,
then we could have conceptualized Decker as an accomplice to Holston's at-
tempt.42 But Holston didn't go through with the murder.43 If Holston had per-
41. Cases of this sort have less to do with conspiracy, since that crime requires all parties to be
planning to commit a crime. In cases like Decker's, there is no meeting of the minds. While
Holston said that he agreed to kill Decker's sister, he did not actually agree to any such
thing. See People v. Superior Court, 157 P. 3d 1017 (Cal. 2007).
42. Section 2.o6(3) (a) (i) of the Model Penal Code makes solicitation itself sufficient for accom-
plice liability, and the commentary makes clear that this is so even if the solicitation had no
actual influence on the principal's performance of the crime. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06
cmt. 6(c) (Official Draft 1962). However, sometimes courts have required not just a show-
ing of solicitation, but also a showing to the effect that the principal was motivated to act by
the solicitation. See, e.g., Workman v. State, 21 N.E.2d 712, 714 (Ind. 1939) ("It is only neces-
sary that the appellant counseled and advised the commission of the crime, and that the
counsel and advice influenced the perpetration of the crime.").
43. Sometimes whether this has occurred is less than clear. For instance, in People v. Berger, 280
P.2d 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955), the defendant, a doctor, was asked by a pregnant investigator
for the district attorney's office to help her procure an illegal abortion. The defendant asked
Inez Brown to do the procedure. Brown came to the investigator's home bearing various
medical tools and began to prepare for the procedure, which she clearly intended to per-
form. Brown was then arrested and Berger was charged as Brown's accomplice. Here the
hard question is whether Brown did enough to have attempted the abortion; the court said
she did. Berger's conviction for attempt was then upheld simply by applying standard rules
of accomplice liability under which the kind of solicitation that Berger made of Brown is
enough to find that Berger was Brown's accomplice.
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formed an act that would have sufficed for an attempt had he, Holston, in fact
intended to commit the crime, then perhaps we could have employed a legal
fiction according to which Holston's act is treated for legal purposes as though
it were Decker's. This is what we do in cases in which, for instance, the defend-
ant asks a child to put poison in another's coffee, and the child complies. 4 But
Holston took no steps at all that could be construed as steps toward commit-
ting murder. 4
Intuitively, it seems that some cases that complicity doctrines are incapable
of resolving are attempts, and some are not.46 For instance, say that the de-
fendant is holding a quantity of heroin and asks another person to take it-
maybe the defendant wants to kick the habit but just can't bring himself to de-
stroy the stuff; the solicited party refuses. In such a case, the defendant has so-
licited possession of heroin. But he obviously hasn't attempted possession of
44. The Model Penal Code would not call these cases of "accomplice" liability but would instead
consider them to be cases in which the defendant is "legally accountable for the conduct of
another," reserving the term "accomplice" for cases in which the offense is actually commit-
ted by the party solicited. But the terms are not important. What matters is this: to motivate
another to engage in conduct sufficient for the act element of the crime can be equivalent,
for legal purposes, to engaging in such conduct oneself. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.o6(2)(a) (Official Draft 1962). There are other differences between those who are "legal-
ly accountable for the conduct of another" and those who are "accomplices." Most im-
portant, the mens rea requirements for the former are the same as those required for the
completed crime, while accomplices need only satisfy lesser mens rea requirements.
4s. The case also defies resolution in another way. In some two-party cases, the defendant's so-
licitation is a means toward completion of the crime by the defendant himself. The defend-
ant who asks another to deliver a threatening letter to a witness is trying to threaten a wit-
ness himself. The solicitation is part of the defendant's own criminal attempt. See, e.g.,
People v. Coleman, 86 N.W.2d 281 (Mich. 1957). However, here Decker was asking Holston
to kill Decker's sister, thus obviating the need for Decker to do it himself.
46. The Model Penal Code has a provision designed to solve a different problem but which ap-
pears at first glance to allow us to deal with cases that defy resolution through familiar ac-
complice liability principles: "A person who engages in conduct designed to aid another to
commit a crime that would establish his complicity ... if the crime were committed by such
other person, is guilty of an attempt to commit the crime, although the crime is not commit-
ted or attempted by such other person." MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(3) (Official Draft 1962).
Although the defendant would be complicit in the solicited party's crime were the solicited
party to do as asked, the defendant, in a hard solicitation-as-attempt case like Decker, does
not "engage in conduct designed to aid" the solicited party. Solicitations aren't ordinarily de-
signed to help others do as asked. Note the difference between this language and the lan-
guage defining the mens rea required for accomplice liability as having a "purpose of pro-
moting or facilitating" the commission of the offense. Id. § 2.o6(3)(a) (emphasis added). In
the most difficult cases, the defendant has the mens rea needed to be an accomplice but not
the mens rea needed to fall under Section 5.01(3). Also, if we interpret Section 5.01(3) more
broadly than this reading suggests, then it follows that all solicitations are attempts. If that's
what the Model Penal Code says, then one starts to wonder what point there is in having
crimes of solicitation at all, given that they always warrant lesser sentences than attempts.
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heroin by so doing. After all, what the defendant is trying to do is to dispossess
himself of the heroin. Imagine, to give another example, that the defendant
asks another to try heroin and is thereby acting on an intention that the other
should use; the solicited party refuses. Did the defendant attempt to use by so-
liciting the other? Of course not. Imagine that the defendant asks another per-
son to drive himself home knowing full well that the solicited party is far too
drunk to drive legally; the other refuses. The defendant has clearly not at-
tempted to drive drunk in such a case, even if his conduct is as wrongful, or
even more wrongful, than such an attempt would have been.
By contrast, imagine that the defendant asks another to carry a quantity of
heroin across the border into the United States; the other refuses. Has the de-
fendant attempted to import drugs into the United States? It seems so. Imag-
ine that the defendant asks another to deface a piece of public property; the
other refuses. It seems that the defendant, in such a case, has attempted to
damage public property. If examples fitting facts of these sorts are constructed
with sufficient care, then all will be irresolvable through accomplice liability
principles. Intuitively, then, some such hard cases are, and some are not, at-
tempts. What facts are being tracked by our intuitions? What principles ought
a court use to decide in such cases?
B. Act Crimes, Result Crimes: How Courts Should Decide
The solution to our problem can be reached by recognizing that in cases
like Decker, the defendant's intention differs from that of the paradigmatic at-
tempter. As we will see, despite this difference, sometimes the defendant's in-
tention commits him to all of the components of the completed crime, and
sometimes it does not. Therefore, sometimes the defendant's intention suffices
for the attempt, and sometimes it does not. In other words, the distinction cru-
cial to the resolution of hard cases is a distinction in mental state; in some such
cases, the defendant has the mens rea for attempt, and in others he does not.
The Guiding Commitment View tells us what intention the attempter has: an
intention that commits him to each of the components of the completed crime.
So it seems likely that we will be able to draw a distinction between those solic-
itations that rise to the level of attempt and those that do not by distinguishing
between those solicitations that are motivated by an intention that commits the
defendant to all the elements of the solicited crime, and those that do not.
In hard solicitation-as-attempt cases like Decker, the defendant's relevant
intention is not an intention to perform any act that would serve as the act ele-
ment of the completed crime. Decker did not intend to point a gun at his sister
and pull the trigger, for instance. But in all such cases, the defendant does in-
tend that the solicited party act in some particular objectionable way: Decker
intends that Holston kill his sister. A crucial question, then, for determining if
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the defendant's solicitation amounts to an attempt is as follows: under what
conditions is an intention with that content sufficient for the intention required
for the attempt?
The answer to this question turns on the distinction between "act" and "re-
suit" elements of crimes. There is a clear distinction between what we merely
cause and what we do. To do is to cause, but to cause is not necessarily to do;
sometimes we cause events that we are not active with respect to in the way that
is required for action. A woman calls her dog from across the street. The dog
runs to her and, much to the woman's horror, is crushed by a passing car. The
woman caused the dog to be crushed, but she did not crush the dog. A particular
event, such as a dog being crushed, is an act element of a crime if, and only if,
three things need to be shown by the prosecution to establish that the defend-
ant committed the offense: that the event occurred, that the defendant caused
the event, and that the defendant was active with respect to it. It must be
shown, that is, that the event occurred and was caused by the defendant in the
way that qualifies it as his doing. By contrast, if the event is a result element, it
needs only to be shown that the event occurred and that the defendant caused
it; the defendant need not be shown to have been active with respect to it. Cir-
cumstantial elements of crimes are those conditions that need to be shown to
have been present, but do not need to be shown either to have been caused by
the defendant or to have been something with respect to which the defendant
was active.47
The distinction between acts and results is both highly intuitive and diffi-
cult to specify with precision. When you walk into a room, you cause the tem-
perature in the room to rise, but that is not something you do. Part of the dif-
ference between results and doings derives from facts about mental state. The
things that you cause unwittingly, without any kind of prior awareness of even
the possibility that you will cause them, are not things with respect to which
you are active. However, intention is not required for activity; there are things
that we do, but unintentionally. Further, prior awareness falling short of inten-
tion, such as awareness of significant risk, plus causation does not suffice for
activity. Even if the woman, in the example just given, who calls her dog was
aware of a risk that her dog would be crushed, it is not the case that she
crushed her dog. In that case, what is missing is a kind of personal involvement
47. Ordinarily, theorists give up on the distinction among act, result, and circumstantial ele-
ments of crimes. But they should not. The key is to recognize that the distinction between
them is in the burden each element places on the prosecutor, rather than in the nature of the
events themselves that constitute the crime. The prosecution bears three burdens with re-
spect to act elements. They must show that the event occurred, that the defendant caused it,
and that the defendant was active with respect to it. The prosecution bears only the first two
burdens when the element is a result and only the first when it is a circumstance.
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in the crucial event -dirty hands -that is present when the event is one with
respect to which the agent is active. The project of laying bare the conditions
that underlie our intuitive judgments about the line between what we do and
what we cause is one of the central projects of the philosophy of action. Ulti-
mately, a proposed specification of the conditions that constitute this distinc-
tion is beholden to our intuitive judgments. To test such a proposal, we need to
compare it to the verdicts that we make in ordinary contexts. We need to de-
cide whether the events that an agent is active with respect to under the ac-
count are those that we would judge, in sober moments, to possess that extra
something that we find in action and for which causation by itself is insuffi-
cient. Luckily, the law's sorting task - the task of sorting those who have com-
mitted crimes from those who have not -can be carried out to a large extent,
even if not always, by appeal to the intuitive judgments to which a precise ac-
count would be beholden. We can move forward trusting that when the prose-
cution needs to show that a defendant was not just the cause of an event but
was also active with respect to that event, juries will know activity when they
see it, and will know also when it has not been shown.
Therefore, under the Guiding Commitment View, the precise intention
needed for an attempt is a function of the classification of the elements of the
completed crime as act, result, or circumstance. The Guiding Commitment
View tells us that what a person has attempted is a function of what his inten-
tion committed him to. Only if the defendant's intention commits him to all
that is involved in the completed crime has he attempted. But what is involved
in the completed crime is in part a function of the classification of its various
elements as act, result, or circumstance. If the completed crime includes the act
of defacing property, then for attempt the defendant's intention must commit
him to property being defaced, to causing property to be defaced, and to being
active with respect to the defacement of the property. By contrast, if the completed
crime includes the result of property being defaced, then the defendant's inten-
tion must commit him only to property being defaced, and to being the cause
of that; it need not commit him to being active with respect to the relevant
event.
While crimes have distinct act elements and result elements, the acts that
the criminal law cares about are virtually always described by reference to their
results. The California murder statute of relevance to Decker's crime, a statute
that is perfectly typical of jurisdictions that have not adopted the Model Penal
Code, reads, "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being... with malice
aforethought."8 Should we characterize this as a crime with the act element of
killing or a crime with the result element of death? It is far from clear what the
48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2014).
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answer is to this question. (More on this below.) Still, it is natural to character-
ize it in the first way, given the appearance in the statute of the term "killing."
So characterized, among the things that must be proven in a murder trial in
California is not just that the defendant caused a death, but also that the de-
fendant was active with respect to that death. By contrast, the Model Penal
Code defines one form of "criminal mischief' like so: "A person is guilty of
criminal mischief if he ... purposely or recklessly causes another to suffer pe-
cuniary loss by deception or threat."49
Here it seems that the act element is deception or threat -a guilty defend-
ant deceived or threatened another-while pecuniary loss is a result element."
A guilty defendant caused pecuniary loss, but it need not be the case that he
was active with respect to the other's loss of money. For a defendant to be guilty
of criminal mischief under the Model Penal Code, he must have caused another
to be deceived or threatened while active with respect to that condition, and must
have caused another to lose something of pecuniary value. But his activity with
respect to the latter condition is irrelevant; it will be present in some guilty de-
fendants, absent in others. The broker who, through deception, takes control
of another's money and loses it is guilty of criminal mischief; the defendant is
active with respect to both the deception and the loss in such a case. But the
person who deceives another and thereby leads him to make an investment
whereby the victim loses his own money has also committed the crime; such a
person has committed criminal mischief even though the defendant is not ac-
tive with respect to the loss of money.
The divide between act elements and result elements is not merely formal;
it is of normative significance. It is something about which legislators ought to
debate when defining a crime by statute. To criminalize the causation of a fe-
tus's death, for instance, would be to criminalize a much larger number of acts
than would be criminalized were the crime to require, instead, the killing of a
fetus. If a defendant is at fault in a minor car accident with a pregnant woman
that results in the death of the fetus, then he has certainly caused a fetus's
death, but it is far less clear that he has killed a fetus. We can imagine cases in
which activity with respect to an event is absent despite the fact that there is
causation. Whether we want to criminalize such behavior under a particular
statute will depend on our normatively significant goals in writing the statute
and will influence what penalty we take to be appropriate for the crime we are
49. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(1)(c) (Official Draft 1962).
50. Could the deception or threat be construed as a result element of this crime? If A causes B to
threaten C in such a way as to cause C pecuniary loss, is A guilty under this statute? Stand-
ard principles of causation would preclude guilt in such a case because B's threat would
amount to voluntary intervention and so A would not in that case have caused C's pecuniary
loss. Therefore, deception or threat must be an act element of the crime.
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defining. One, although not the only, relevant factor is this: when an event,
like a fetus's death, figures into the description of the act required for the
crime -when what is criminalized is "the killing of a fetus" -the mens rea re-
quirement for the act and the result cannot be different. A person who reckless-
ly kills a fetus is also reckless with respect to the death of the fetus. By contrast,
when an act element is separately defined from the result element -when what
is criminalized is, for instance, any act that "causes the death of a fetus" -then
there is room for the mens rea with respect to the act and result to diverge; it is
possible to intentionally run a red light and only negligently thereby cause a
fetus's death. So the act-result distinction makes a difference to what is crimi-
nalized. Although it is a formal distinction, the act-result divide is a formal dis-
tinction of normative importance.
Some intentions commit one to causing a particular result and commit one
to being active with respect to it. Others commit one only to causing it. Alt-
hough it is an imperfect guide, we often register this difference by describing
what the person intends either with the word "to" or, instead, with the word
"that." An intention to buy milk constitutes a commitment to both milk being
bought and to the buying of it being something one does, or is active with re-
spect to. An intention that milk is bought constitutes a commitment to causing
that, but no commitment to doing it oneself. Someone with the intention to
buy milk might be prompted to take a trip to the store. Someone who intends
that milk be bought might be prompted to put it on the list of things that her
friend, and not she, is to buy later.
Under the Guiding Commitment View, a person has attempted a crime on-
ly if his intention commits him to each of the elements of the completed crime.
So, if the completed crime includes a particular result, such as "pecuniary loss,"
it suffices that the attempter intend that there should be pecuniary loss. If the
completed crime includes a particular act, such as "deception or threat," then it
is necessary that the attempter intend to deceive or threaten; an intention that a
victim should be deceived or threatened will not suffice.
This distinction is the key to understanding the conditions under which a
solicitation is an attempt. Recall that in cases like Decker, the defendant does
not intend that he act himself, but only that the solicited party perform an act
that would serve as the act element of the completed crime. Under what condi-
tions does this show that the defendant lacks the mens rea of attempt? The de-
fendant's intention is sufficient for the mens rea of attempt when the event that the de-
fendant intends the solicited party to cause is a result element of the completed crime,
but his intention is insufficient for the mens rea of attempt if that event figures in the
specification of an act element of the completed crime. This conclusion follows im-




So does Decker have the intention needed for an attempt to murder his sis-
ter? Since California's homicide law apparently provides that one must have
killed another in order to have committed murder -thereby incorporating the
other's death into the definition of an act element of the crime-the answer ap-
pears to be "no." Under such a statute, an attempt to murder requires an inten-
tion to kill, something that Decker lacks; his intention that his sister die is not
enough for attempted murder under California law because it does not commit
him to being active with respect to that result, and so does not commit him to
killing anyone. However, consider the Model Penal Code's alternative defini-
tion of homicide: "A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely,
knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human be-
ing.""1 Here the act element is left undescribed; any act at all could serve for the
act element of the completed crime, even an act that was not a killing. The
death of a human being is a result element of the crime. Under the Model Penal
Code, all purposive or knowing - as well as some reckless - criminal homicides
are classified as murders provided that they are not committed under extreme
emotional distress. Therefore, a person should be able to try to commit mur-
der, as defined by the Model Penal Code, by intending to perform some act and
intending that another dies. Decker has these two intentions, for he intends to
solicit Holston and intends that his sister die. Therefore, Decker has attempted
a murder under the Model Penal Code's definition of that crime. s2
A court faced with a statute that specifies "causing A" as an element must
consider whether there is an appropriate verb that would have allowed "A-ing"
instead of "causing A." If so, then that is a powerful reason to take A to be a re-
sult element. Consider, for instance, a statute prohibiting "causing the release
of classified information." That the legislature did not instead prohibit "releas-
ing classified information" is evidence that the information's release is a result
rather than an act element of the crime. However, if there is no such verb, then
the statute is ambiguous; agency can be present even when there is no relevant
verb. Consider, for instance, a statute prohibiting "causing a wildfire." Since
there is no verb "to wildfire," it is unclear whether the occurrence of the wild-
fire is an act or result element of the crime. In such a case, the court may have
no choice but to ask whether the normatively relevant category of conduct is
the one in which the agent is active with respect to the event, or the one in
which he is merely the cause of it.
Conversely, when a court is faced with a statute that specifies "A-ing" as an
element of the crime, but the legislature could just as easily have criminalized
51. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1) (Official Draft 1962).
52. Decker has not attempted to kill; but just as one can murder without killing under the Model
Penal Code, one can attempt murder without attempting to kill under it.
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"causing A," that is one piece of evidence that the element in question is an act
element. In the absence of a special reason to think the element is a result ele-
ment, it should be classified as an act element. However, the fact that the legis-
lature could have written the statute either way is a highly defeasible piece of
evidence because legislatures are not as attuned to the distinction between acts
and results as they should be and so may have intended the element in question
to be a result while using an active verb to refer to it. In such cases, an argu-
ment showing that causing A is just as bad as - or just as legitimately criminal-
ized as -A-ing will support the characterization of the element in question as a
result element, despite the statutory language.
Although I will not defend the claim here, it seems to me that the Model
Penal Code's definition of homicide (with the death of another as a result ele-
ment rather than killing another as an act element) is superior, on normative
grounds, to definitions, like that in California, under which a killing is appar-
ently required-or, rather, in which such a requirement fits most naturally
with the statute's language.53 But the important point for our purposes is that
the question of whether a solicitor has the intention needed for an attempt has
to be settled by a normative argument over how to define the completed crime.
One can imagine the Decker court's having reached the verdict it sought, even
given the language of California's murder statute, by claiming that, despite ap-
pearances to the contrary, the death of another is a result element of the crime
of murder in California. To do this, the court would have had to abandon the
most natural interpretation of the explicit language of the statute, but there
may be an argument for doing so. After all, the court might have reasoned,
common law homicide definitions were formulated using language that was
developed without the act-result distinction firmly in mind, and so it would be
no surprise if some statutes were drafted with language misleadingly suggest-
ing that a result element figures, instead, into the description of an act element.
The fact that, on normative grounds, it is arguably better for death to be con-
sidered a result strengthens the case for this form of argument.
C. Taking Stock
In attempt and solicitation, not to mention conspiracy, we recognize a
sense in which the criminality of the act is diluted in comparison to that from
which its criminality derives, namely the completed crime attempted or solicit-
53. The Model Penal Code does not provide much by way of a normative defense of this claim,
but says only, "It seems clear that causing death purposely, knowingly, and recklessly...
must in the absence of justification or excuse establish criminality." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 21o.1 cmt (Official Draft 1962). I quite agree. The important point for our purposes is that
it is not so under homicide laws like those in California when they are read literally.
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ed. If completed crimes are blood red, then attempts and solicitations seem to
be shades of pink. This metaphor tempts one to imagine that the more we
stack attempts and solicitations on top of one another, and the more attenuated
the relation to the completed crime becomes, the more diluted is the criminal
liability. However, this is only a metaphor and one by which we should not be
misled. In attempted crimes we do what we can to extend our agency into the
world in objectionable ways. In solicitations, we do what we can to extend an-
other's agency into the world in objectionable ways. What has been shown in
this Part is that one way to extend one's own agency into the world is to lead
another to extend his. This is so when all that is required to extend one's own
agency into the world in an objectionable way is to cause a result. In order to
try to cause a result, it is enough to ask another to bring it about. Others can-
not act for us, but they can alter the world on our behalf, and sometimes to ask
someone to do so is enough to try to do so oneself.
It is important to see how the idea that solicitation rises to the level of at-
tempt in result crimes, and not in act crimes, derives from the theoretical
framework developed in Parts I, II, and III. Under the Transfer Principle, the
prohibition of an action is also an implicit prohibition of an attempt to engage
in that action; a prohibition of causing a result is an implicit prohibition of an
attempt to cause that result.' Either way, the prohibited attempt is of the sort
that would count as an attempt under the Guiding Commitment View. This
type of prohibited attempt, in turn, requires an intention that commits one to
that which is involved in completion. If completion involves an act, then the
attempt requires an intention that commits one to three things: an event's oc-
currence, being the cause of it, and being active with respect to it. An intention
that a solicited party act in the prohibited way does not commit the defendant
to being active with respect to that which the solicited party is asked to cause.
Therefore, the defendant is not, in such a case, attempting to engage in the
prohibited conduct in the sense of relevance to criminal law; he lacks an inten-
tion-based commitment as required for the attempt. By contrast, if what is
prohibited is the causing of an event, then the defendant has attempted only if
s4. One might wonder if we could reach the doctrinal result argued for here-namely, that a
solicitation of a result crime rises to the level of an attempt but not a solicitation of an act
crime-just by appeal to the Transfer Principle and without the Guiding Commitment
View. But we cannot. Imagine an alternative to the Guiding Commitment View according to
which a person attempts an act provided he has an intention that commits him to causing
the result involved in the act; he is trying to kill, for instance, provided he has an intention-
based commitment to causing the death, even if he lacks an intention-based commitment to
being active with respect to that death. Such a view would have different implications with
respect to solicitation-as-attempt cases than the Guiding Commitment View. Therefore, it is
essential to the argument here that the Guiding Commitment View, and not other views of
the nature of attempt, supports the Transfer Principle.
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he has an intention that commits him to the event's occurrence and commits
him to causing it. He can be so committed by an intention that a solicited party
cause the event. He therefore may have an intention that suffices for the at-
tempt. The conception of attempt on offer in this Article, that is, provides us
with principled grounds on which to resolve hard solicitation-as-attempt cases
of a sort that have baffled the courts.
V. CIRCUMSTANCES AND "IMPOSSIBILITY"
A. Clearing Ground and Setting Aside Legal and Factual Impossibility
There is perhaps no area of criminal law in which there is more confusion,
on the parts of both courts and commentators, than in the adjudication of so-
called "impossible" attempts. Consider an appealing line of thought that leads
to a disastrous set of doctrines, namely the doctrines employing the distinction
between "legal" and "factual" impossibility. Start with cases sometimes dubbed
as "pure legal impossibility" cases: a married man tries to commit adultery and
fails. The object of his affections is not interested. Ashamed and falsely believ-
ing that adultery is illegal, he runs to his local police station to turn himself in
for attempted adultery. The police laugh in his face and send him home. Why?
Because: it is not a crime to attempt to do something that would not be crimi-
nal were you to have done as intended. Had the attempted adulterer succeeded,
he would have committed no crime, and so his attempt was no crime. So far so
good. Or so it seems.
But now let's extend that principle. Consider a case that has occupied the
imagination of many a criminal law theorist, namely People v. Jaffe."s The de-
fendant, who was suspected of regularly aiding thieves by selling the goods
they took, was charged with an attempt to receive stolen property after he pur-
chased some fabric that he believed to be stolen s6 but that was in fact falsely
represented to him as stolen as part of a sting operation. 7 At least part of what
Jaffe intended was to receive property. But in fulfilling that intention, Jaffe did
not commit a crime, because the property he intended to receive was not sto-
len. Apply the principle appealed to in the case of the attempted adulterer, and
it appears to follow that Jaffe has not attempted receipt of stolen property. In
both cases, that is, the defendant has an intention such that, were it fulfilled
(and in Jaffe's case it actually was filfilled), there would be no crime. Now, if
Jaffe did not attempt receipt of stolen property, then attempt liability radically
55. 78 N.E. 169 (N.Y. 19o6).
56. Id. at 169.
57. See id. at 170-71 (Chase, J., dissenting).
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shrinks, as do the tools available to law enforcement. In order to avoid this out-
come, judges sought a distinction between a case like that of the attempted
adulterer and a case like Jaffe. It is not implausible to think that what distin-
guishes the cases is that the attempted adulterer made a mistake of law, while
Jaffe made a mistake of fact. Hence a bit of doctrine is born: if the obstacle to
completion is factual, the attempt is criminal (the case is one of "factual impos-
sibility"), while if the obstacle is legal, the attempt is not criminal (the case is
one of "legal impossibility").
But the doctrine is a disaster, and, thankfully, has almost disappeared in
the United States. The problems are many and need not be rehearsed here. ss
What is of importance to us is a subtle error that leads to the doctrine, an error
that we must not make in thinking about cases like Jaffe. The reason that the
attempted adulterer has committed no crime is that he is not committed by his
intention to all of the components of any crime. He is committed, instead, to
the components of a non-criminal form of conduct, namely adultery. The mis-
take is in thinking that the right question to ask is, "Would the attempted adul-
terer have committed a crime had he done as intended?" This is the wrong
question because it invites an answer in which we appeal to facts about the
world to which the defendant is not committed by his intention -namely any
facts that would be in place were he to do as intended. Recall the "wide" sense
of trying, discussed in Part I, under which any facts about what the person
would do were he to do as he intends- including facts about whether his con-
duct would be criminal -can be appealed to in a description of what he is try-
ing to do. To explain why the attempted adulterer has committed no crime by
appealing to the fact that he would not have committed a crime had he done as
intended is to assume that the sense of "try" that informs the criminal law is
the "wide" sense, rather than the sense defined under the Guiding Commit-
ment View. Accepting such an explanation of the non-criminality of the at-
tempted adulterer's conduct would be to invite mistake in the treatment of a
case like Jaffe. The right question to ask about Jaffe is not "Would he have
committed a crime had he done as intended?" - a question to which the answer
is "no." The right question is, "Was he committed by his intention to all of the
components of the crime of receipt of stolen property?" -a question to which
the answer may be "yes" (for reasons to be explained below). We need to at-
58. See Larry Alexander, Inculpatory and Exculpatory Mistakes and the Fact/Law Distinction: An
Essay in Memory ofMyke Balyes, 12 LAW & PHIL. 33 (1993); Kenneth W. Simons, Mistake and
Impossibility, Law and Fact, and Culpability: A Speculative Essay, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
447 (i99o). One obvious problem is that many obstacles that courts hope to classify as "fac-
tual" are legally constituted. The property that Jaffe received had been stolen and then re-
covered. That recovered property is not properly classified as "stolen" is a legal fact, but such
a case would ordinarily be classified as one of factual impossibility. It is difficult to see why.
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tend not to what would be the case were the defendant to do as intended, but
to that to which he is committed by his intention.
This change in orientation radically alters the problem. The important is-
sue not only has nothing to do with the fact-law distinction, but also has noth-
ing to do with impossibility. Sometimes we are committed by our intentions to
things that cannot come to pass, sometimes to things that can. What is crucial
is what we are committed to, not whether it can come to pass. The next step is to
remember that, as emphasized in Part II, a person can be committed by his in-
tention to a condition without being committed to promoting that condition.
We can also be committed to not reconsidering our intention in light of the
presence of the condition, and thanks to an intention, we can be committed to
not complaining that the world is in a certain condition. When we have these
forms of commitment, we are under no pressure to adopt necessary means to
realizing the condition to which we are committed. Under the Guiding Com-
mitment View, when a person is not committed to promoting a condition, but
is committed to it in one of these other two ways, then the condition can be
appealed to in a characterization of what he is trying to do. So if it were the
case that Jaffe was committed in one of these ways by his intention to the prop-
erty being stolen, then he attempted receipt of stolen property in the sense that is
criminalized under the Transfer Principle. Was he?
B. Beliefand the Rebuttable Presumption
It is obvious that in a case like Jaffe a crucial fact about the defendant that
informs our belief that he attempted a crime is that he believed that the proper-
ty he received was stolen. Similarly, recall that Crow believed that the person
he tried to sexually exploit, "StephieFL," was a minor. And there are many oth-
er cases with the same structure. Not all such cases have led to conviction for
attempt, even though that is by far the most common result.5 9 In United States
v. Berrigan,6° for instance, the defendant thought that he was smuggling letters
out of the prison in which he was housed without the warden's knowledge.61
59- Compare United States v. Butters, 267 F. App'x 773 (loth Cir. 2008) (deeming the absence of
an actual minor "irrelevant"), and Laughner v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that soliciting sex from an undercover agent whom the defendant thought was a
minor was attempt), with Gibbs v. State, 898 N.E.2d 124o (Ind. Ct. App. 20o8), overruled by
King v. State, 921 N.E.2d 1288 (Ind. 2010) (holding that a case could not be proved because
it did not actually involve a minor), and People v. Thousand, 614 N.W.2d 674 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2000), rev'd, 631 N.W.2d 694 (Mich. 2001) (dismissing the charge of attempt because
the defendant's "object of... desire" was actually an adult and not a minor).
60. 482 F.2d 171 (3 d Cir. 1973).
61. Id. at 179.
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In fact, the warden knew all about it and was allowing the letters to leave so as
to help the police track the activity outside the prison that Berrigan was direct-
ing through the letters. 62 The court acquitted Berrigan of the attempt to smug-
gle letters out without the warden's knowledge on the ground that the presence
of the circumstantial element of the completed crime (namely that the warden
did not know) was required for the attempt. 63 If this seems like the wrong re-
sult in this case, it is at least in part because Berrigan believed the warden did
not know of the letters. The defendant's belief seems to matter, but why?
One might think that any view, such as the Guiding Commitment View,
that requires for attempt an intention-based commitment to each of the condi-
tions involved in the completed crime must say that belief is insufficient in cas-
es like Jaffe, Crow, and Berrigan. After all, it is common to believe a condition to
be in place without it being something to which one is committed by one's in-
tention. The runner believes that he lives in Los Angeles, but we cannot infer
from this fact, together with the fact that he intends to go running, the further
claim that he intends to go running in Los Angeles. That is something that he
takes for granted, not something that he directs his will toward in the form of
an intention. Perhaps it is like that with Jaffe, or Crow, or Berrigan. Perhaps
62. Id. at 184.
63. Id. at 189-9o. One recent case reaches the same kind of conclusion through very different
reasoning from that employed in Berrigan. In Moore v. State, 882 A.2d 256 (Md. 2005), the
defendant made arrangements with an undercover detective whom he believed to be four-
teen years old to meet to have sex. The appellate court noted that the completed crime is
strict liability with respect to age, and so can be committed by someone in the absence of an
intention to have sex with a minor; even someone who intends to have sex with an adult can
be guilty of the completed offense provided that the person he has sex with is actually a mi-
nor. The court then analogized strict liability crimes to crimes of negligence, like involuntary
manslaughter, that cannot be committed with intent. Id. at 268-69. Someone who intends
to kill is guilty of a purposive homicide rather than involuntary manslaughter, and this gives
rise to the rule that there is no crime of attempted involuntary manslaughter. This same rea-
soning applies to any other crime that cannot be completed with intent. Extending this well-
known rule, the court concluded that it is not possible to attempt a strict liability crime such
as that at issue in the case; as a result, the defendant was acquitted. Id. at 269-7o. After all,
reasoned the court, completed strict liability crimes do not involve intent any more than
crimes of negligence do. The problem with the court's reasoning is that strict liability
crimes, unlike involuntary manslaughter and other crimes of negligence, can be committed
by someone with the intention that an attempter has; they just don't require such an inten-
tion. So even those who think that there are no attempts of crimes like involuntary man-
slaughter can consistently hold that there are attempts of strict liability crimes. In fact, some
courts have taken it to be easier to attempt crimes of strict liability; they have thought that in
such cases not even belief that the relevant circumstantial element is in place is required for
the attempt. Cf Commonwealth v. Dunne, 4 74 N.E.2d 538, 544-45 (Mass. 1985) (upholding
conviction for attempted statutory rape in the absence of any evidence of defendant's mens
rea with respect to the victim's age).
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they believe that the relevant conditions are in place, without those conditions
being things to which they are committed by their intentions.
And indeed this is possible. It is just extremely unlikely. There are quite
complicated principles that govern the flow of information from one mental
state to another; sometimes content bleeds from one mental state to another,
and sometimes it does not. Often, people who believe that Obama is Hawaiian
and believe that Obama is President also believe that a Hawaiian is President.
But a particular person might not have this further belief. He might not "put
two and two together." If asked if a Hawaiian has ever been President, he
might have to think about it, or he might even answer "no" before realizing
that this conflicts with an implication of other things that he believes. Failures
to put two and two together have two related sources of importance. First, we
sometimes fail to put two and two together because one belief or the other is
buried; it is not "before the mind" in the way that it would need to be to serve
as a premise in reasoning through which its content would bleed into the oth-
er. This might be the case for someone who knows that Obama is Hawaiian
but has not given that any thought in some time. Second, and alternatively, a
person can fail to put two and two together because one of the facts is extreme-
ly unimportant to him; it is not salient. Someone who doesn't care about such
things will not have the thought that the President is a dog owner, even if he
has the thought that Obama is a dog owner, and the thought that Obama is
President.
These examples involve pairs of beliefs, but we find the same limitations on
content moving from a belief to an intention. Someone who intends to vote for
Obama might not intend to vote for a dog owner, even though he knows that
Obama is a dog owner. That fact just does not matter to him. Or even if it does
matter to him, it might not be before his mind at the time that he intends to
vote for Obama. But notice how rare it is in criminal cases like Jaffe, Crow, and
Berrigan for either the relevant beliefs to be buried or for the conditions not to
be salient to the defendant. The relevant conditions are labeled as parts of
crimes, which itself makes them salient in the minds of many people. Further-
more, in many cases they are labeled as such because they are morally im-
portant. And even many of those with radically different moral views from
those enshrined in criminal law recognize that the prospect of punishment is
linked to the presence or absence of the relevant conditions, and that, for most,
makes the conditions salient. This is not to say that there are no defendants in
whom the beliefs are buried or the conditions not salient; there undoubtedly
are, but they are rare. They are rare enough for the fact of belief in the relevant
condition to provide a rebuttable presumption that the condition is included in
the content of the defendant's intention. Given that he believes that the proper-
ty is stolen and intends to receive property, we can be virtually certain that Jaffe
intends to receive stolen property; given that he believes that StephieFL is thir-
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teen and that he intends to sexually exploit her, we can be virtually certain that
Crow intends to sexually exploit a minor; given that he believes the warden is
ignorant of his activities and that he intends to send letters, we can be virtually
certain that Berrigan intends to send letters without the warden's knowledge. Can
we be certain that the relevant conditions bleed from the defendants' beliefs to
their intentions? It is not a conceptual truth, but in the absence of evidence that
defeats the claim, there is every reason to think the intention includes a repre-
sentation of the believed condition.
So if we ask, "What is the appropriate mens rea standard in attempt with
respect to the circumstantial elements of the completed crime?" the answer is
"intent." That is an implication of the Guiding Commitment View that we
should embrace. But mental states "lower" on the mens rea hierarchy can pro-
vide extremely good evidence, sufficient evidence in the absence of rebuttal, for
the needed intention. If there are remaining intuitions that intent is too high a
standard in this domain, then they arise from a failure to appreciate the fact
that one can intend a condition, and thereby be committed to it, without hav-
ing any commitment to promote it. To say that Crow intends to sexually ex-
ploit a minor is not to say that he would have dropped his pursuit of her photo-
graphs had he discovered she was not a minor. Maybe he would have been
happy to receive sexually explicit pictures of either a minor or an adult. Who
knows? But still, given that he intended to sexually exploit a minor, he was
committed to her being a minor in both the senses of non-reconsideration and
non-complaint. He could not rationally have changed his mind on encounter-
ing further evidence of her minor status; nor could he complain that the world
came out differently from the way he intended if, in the end, he sexually ex-
ploited a minor. These are commitments that he incurs compatible with the
absence of any commitment on his part to see to, or promote, the object of his
sexual exploitation's being a minor. And it is thanks to the fact that he has the-
se intention-based commitments that he is properly said to have attempted to
sexually exploit a minor in the sense of relevance to criminal law.
C. Recklessness and the Relevance of the Facts
Cases in which the defendant believes the relevant circumstantial element
of the completed crime to be present are not, by any means, the only sort. A de-
fendant who tries to take something that he lacks permission to take might fall
short of belief that he lacks permission; perhaps he is merely reckless in this re-
spect- his wife was supposed to ask permission for him to take his neighbor's
car, but he's not sure if she remembered. His belief is aptly characterized as
probabilistic, rather than "flat-out." He does not flat-out believe that he lacks
permission; he believes, instead, that there's a decent chance he lacks permis-
sion. Did such a defendant attempt theft? A defendant who tries to buy a stereo
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off the back of a truck falls short of belief that the stereo is stolen -maybe it's
just a roaming garage sale-but he knows there's a good chance that it is. Did
such a defendant attempt to receive stolen property?
Notice that these recklessness cases are importantly different from those
involving defendants who are negligent or even blamelessly oblivious to the
presence of certain conditions. In negligent attempts, there is no mental state
the content of which can bleed into the content of the intention. Hence there is
no intention-based commitment to the relevant condition. This is why it is just
false to say that someone who tries to have sex with someone underage, but
whom he unreasonably believes to be an adult, has attempted rape. This is false
even if negligence, or less, will suffice for the completed crime. When it comes
to the attempt, we need intention-based commitment. Furthermore, when
there is no mental representation of the relevant condition, there is no such
commitment.
Under the Guiding Commitment View, the question in recklessness cases,
by contrast to negligence cases, is parallel to the question involved in the flat-
out belief cases: is the defendant committed to the condition (that he lacks
permission, that the property is stolen) by his intention? If so, then we can ap-
peal to the condition in describing what he is trying to do (steal rather than
merely take; receive stolen property); and if not, then we cannot. To a point,
although only to a point, the solution is the same as well: the content of the
probabilistic belief can be presumed to bleed into the content of the intention
in the absence of a failure on the defendant's part to put two and two together.
However, there is an important difference. When the content of the probabilis-
tic belief bleeds into the content of the intention, the defendant does not intend
to receive stolen property, but instead intends to receive possibly stolen property.
So we have a new question: does an intention-based commitment to the prop-
erty's possibly being stolen suffice for the kind of commitment to its being stolen
that is needed for attempt to receive stolen property?
The answer is, for reasons to be explained, that it suffices only if the property
is actually stolen. In short, whether the intention to receive possibly stolen prop-
erty constitutes a commitment to the property's being stolen depends on
whether it is, in fact, stolen. To see this, start by noticing that an intention to
receive possibly stolen property does not generate a commitment of non-
reconsideration with respect to the property's being stolen. A person with that
intention whose doubt is removed -the guy on the back of the truck, for in-
stance, says, "By the way, this stuff is hot" - could rationally reconsider his in-
tention in light of the newly formed belief that the property is stolen. A rational
agent might be willing to go through with the purchase when he's not certain
and unwilling to go through with it when he is. So, if the intention to receive
possibly stolen property commits one to its being stolen, it cannot be because it
generates a commitment of non-reconsideration.
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What about a commitment to not complaining? Here there are conditions
under which the intention in question generates such a commitment. Say, for
instance, that the stereo is purchased and the purchaser is arrested, and it is
demonstrated that the stereo is stolen. Can the purchaser rationally deflect crit-
icism from himself by noting that at least the world is not in a condition he in-
tended it to be in? No, for the intention depicts the property as stolen, with
some degree of likelihood, and unstolen with some other degree of likelihood.
Given that the property is in fact stolen, the intention's depiction of the proper-
ty's status is accurate; the intention matches the world. If you think the world
might be a certain way, and it is that way, then you were right. If you think the
world might be one of two ways, and it turns out to be one of them, then you
were right. Similarly, if an intention depicts the world as possibly a certain
way, and the world is that way, then the intention matches the world.
Since it would be irrational for the defendant to insist that the stereo's be-
ing stolen is something he did not intend, he has a commitment of non-
complaint with respect to the property's being stolen. But notice: he only has
that commitment if the property is actually stolen. If the property turns out not to
be stolen, then that is something that he is committed to not complaining
about. What he is committed to not complaining about is a function of how
things are. What follows is that when the defendant is merely reckless with re-
spect to the relevant condition, he has attempted the crime only if the condition is
actually in place. So, whether the prosecution bears a burden to show that the
condition is in place depends on what the defendant's mental state is. If the de-
fendant believes the condition to be in place, then the prosecution bears no
such burden. But if the defendant is merely reckless with respect to the condi-
tion, then the prosecution must establish that the condition is in place in order
to establish that the defendant attempted the crime. Put conversely: when the
prosecution is able to prove only that the defendant was reckless with respect to a par-
ticular circumstance, then the prosecution must also prove that the circumstance was
in place in order to show that the defendant attempted the crime.
One of the things that is uncovered here is the root of a particular source of
confusion in the conceptualization of attempt. We recognize, and without diffi-
culty, that when it comes to a completed crime like receipt of stolen property,
there are two different and separable questions to ask. First: was the property
stolen? Second: did the defendant believe that the property was stolen? There
are two questions because there are two different morally salient facts: one
about the property's status and another about the mental state of the defendant
with respect to that fact. But when theorists have tackled cases of "impossible"
attempt - cases like Jaffe, Crow, or Berrigan, or equivalent cases involving reck-
lessness rather than knowledge-the question of whether the circumstances
need to be in place has seemed to be inextricably intertwined with the question
of what the defendant's mental attitude needs to be toward the circumstance.
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The result is that the opposite sides of the bar talk past each other. One side
sees the import of the circumstantial facts, the other of the mental state-and it
can seem as though adjudicating the dispute requires deciding which of the
two matters, to the neglect of the other.
But there is a reason why the facts and the defendant's mental state with
respect to them seem entwined in attempt: they are entwined in attempt. When
the defendant's intent is, for instance, to sexually exploit someone who might be
a minor, he is attempting to sexually exploit a minor only if the victim is in fact a
minor. The facts are relevant to what his mental state commits him to. What
his mental state commits him to is relevant to what he is trying to do in the
sense of relevance to the criminal law. And what he is trying to do in that sense
is relevant to whether he has committed a criminal attempt, because we crimi-
nalize attempts under the Transfer Principle. The abstract bit of progress made
here in philosophy of mind and action -noting the range of commitments be-
yond commitments of promotion-is not merely that; instead, it is identifying
something about which those who care about crime and culpability ought to
care.
D. Taking Stock
In our resolution of the problem of solicitation-as-attempt, we needed to
appeal to the Guiding Commitment View and to a plausible theory of the dis-
tinction between result and act elements of crimes. Only one implication of the
Guiding Commitment View mattered to the analysis: where we find the kind
of trying that matters to criminal responsibility, we also find an intention that
commits the agent to each of the conditions involved in completion. The prob-
lem of solicitation-as-attempt did not require appeal to the distinction, devel-
oped in Part II, among the three different types of intention-based commit-
ment, namely commitments of promotion, non-reconsideration, and non-
complaint.
However, our resolution of the problem of "impossibility" in this Part has
indeed required appeal to that tripartite distinction. A failure to appreciate that
there are ways to be committed to a condition that do not amount to commit-
ments of promotion can lead one to the mistaken conclusion that intent is too
high a mens rea standard with respect to circumstantial elements in attempt.
This failure can lead one to the conclusion, that is, that attempt does not re-
quire intention-based commitments to each of the elements of the crime at-
tempted; the circumstantial elements, at least, are exempted. But the recogni-
tion that there are indeed forms of intention-based commitment that fall short
of commitments of promotion allows us to see something new: the Guiding
Commitment View's implication that attempt requires intent (even with re-
spect to circumstantial elements of completion) is not just unproblematic, but
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in fact allows for an insight. It allows for the recognition that sometimes what
your intentions commit you to is partly a matter of what is in fact the case.
In short, it is because of the tripartite division among types of intention-
based commitment that it is defensible to view intent as the appropriate mens
rea standard with respect to circumstances in attempt. That tripartite division
also leads to the conclusion that a rebuttable presumption of mens rea is gener-
ated by both (a) belief that the circumstance is in place or (b) recklessness with
respect to the circumstance when, in fact, the circumstance is in place.
VI. ABANDONMENT AND CHANGE OF MIND
Recall how we got here. We started with the idea of the Transfer Principle:
attempts are crimes because they are implicitly prohibited in our prohibitions
of completed crimes. This insight provided us with a constraint on an account
of what, exactly, attempts are in the legally relevant sense: they must be such as
to inherit their criminality from completion. This constraint, in turn, led to the
formulation of the Guiding Commitment View, an account of attempt that is
both intuitively appealing and supports the result that attempts are implicitly
prohibited whenever completions are. The Guiding Commitment View, in-
formed as it is by recent work on intention, allows principled resolution of the
problems of solicitation-as-attempt and (so-called) "impossibility." But as we
will see in this Part, the Transfer Principle allows for resolution of at least one
thorny problem about attempt, namely the problem of abandonment, even
without appeal to the Guiding Commitment View and its associated theory of
the nature of the commitments constituted by our intentions. The Transfer
Principle, that is, is independently fruitful. Just by recognizing that the reasons
for criminalizing attempt all derive from the reasons for criminalizing comple-
tion - an implication of the Transfer Principle - we are able to see under what
conditions abandonment is relevant to criminal responsibility for attempt, and
how.
A. The Problem
Consider Arin Ahmed, a Palestinian who tried to kill a number of Jews in a
public place through a suicide bombing but changed her mind before the plan
was complete.64 Here is how Ahmed describes how it came to pass that she
stopped herself before anyone was hurt:
64. The example is singled out, also in a discussion of abandoned attempts, by JOSHUA DIEss-
LER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 800 (4th ed. 2007).
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I got out of the car.... I saw a lot of people, mothers with children,
teenage boys and girls. I remembered an Israeli girl my age whom I
used to be in touch with. I suddenly understood what I was about to do
and I said to myself: How can I do such a thing? I changed my mind.6s
There is no doubting the prevalence and strength of the intuition that someone
like Ahmed is importantly different, and ought to be treated differently under
the law, from someone who got out of the car intent on a suicide bombing and
was wrestled to the ground by police before any damage could be done. The
fact of change of mind seems intuitively to be of tremendous ethical im-
portance to responsibility for attempt. In fact, the Model Penal Code gives ex-
pression to this idea in its affirmative defense of abandonment. Under Model
Penal Code § 5.01(4), a person who abandons an attempt (under certain condi-
tions that appear to be met in Ahmed's case) has an affirmative defense from
the charge.66 Twenty-six jurisdictions in the United States follow the Model
Penal Code approach in allowing an affirmative defense of abandonment, 6' and
some commentators who oppose it favor, instead, granting mitigation rather
than a complete defense to those who, like Ahmed, abandon their attempts for
laudatory reasons.68 It is very hard these days to find anyone defending the
common law position that abandonment is of no relevance to guilt for attempt.
Even judges in jurisdictions that have never granted a defense or mitigation on
the basis of abandonment tend to avoid asserting that none is to be granted as a
matter of law in their jurisdictions. For instance, while there is officially no
abandonment defense in federal law, federal judges faced with the question
tend to do their best to avoid the issue by claiming that even if abandonment
were a defense or provided mitigation, the defendant before them provided in-
sufficient evidence of abandonment.6 9 In fact, we see this even in cases in
which the evidence of abandonment would likely suffice for defense or mitiga-
tion in a jurisdiction that explicitly recognizes defense or mitigation in cases of
abandonment.
65. Id. (quoting Vered Levy-Barzilai, Prisoners'Dilemmas, HARPER'S MAG., Sept. 2002, at 17, 21).
66. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) (Official Draft 1962). The Model Penal Code provides for
abandonment defenses to conspiracy, as well as solicitation. Id. SS 5.02(3), 5.03(6).
67. Evan Tsen Lee, Cancelling Crime, 30 CONN. L. REV. 117, 12o n.13 (1997).
68. See, e.g., id. at 118.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Shelton, 30 F.3d 702, 706-07 (6th Cir. 1994) ("There is no objec-
tive evidence corroborating [the defendant's] alleged change of heart; rather, all of Shelton's
actions were consistent with the planned commission of the offense."); United States v.
Tanks, No. 92-3023, 1992 WL 317179, at *6 (6th Cir. Oct. 27, 1992) ("[T]here is not any ev-
identiary support for.., an instruction [on abandonment] in this case.").
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Moral intuition (not to mention legal codes, like Model Penal Code
5.01(4)) supports the further idea that the defendant's motive for abandoning
his attempt is of crucial importance to the question of whether to punish the
defendant or to reduce his punishment. To give the most obvious example, a
defendant who abandons his attempt because he discovers that if he goes
through with the crime he will be caught -perhaps a police car happens to be
passing by unexpectedly -does not deserve a defense or mitigation. After all,
he is in no better a moral position than the defendant who is stopped through
frank physical force by the police; the fact that he stops himself is irrelevant.
There are other examples, too. A defendant who stalks a victim intending a
robbery, but decides to wait until later to complete it when he comes to believe
that if he waits he can commit the robbery after the victim has visited an ATM,
does not deserve a defense or mitigation. Broadly speaking, we recognize vari-
ous impure motives for abandoning -motives importantly different from Ah-
med's motives - that undermine whatever mitigating force the abandonment
has. But why is this? Whatever rationale we give for granting a defense or mit-
igation on the basis of abandonment must support the idea that the motive for
abandonment matters; a bad motive for abandoning can undermine abandon-
ment's mitigating force.
In addition to accounting for the fact that the motive for abandoning mat-
ters, a principled account of how the courts should respond to abandoned at-
tempts must be consistent with the fact that abandonment of the kind that is
puzzling happens after the defendant has attempted a crime. To be sure, there
are cases in which the defendant abandons before he's even tried to commit the
crime; imagine the person who intends to rob a bank, has a hearty breakfast in
preparation, and then changes his mind. But the explanation for why criminal
penalties are inappropriate in cases like that does not appeal to the fact of
change of mind. Instead, it points to the fact that the defendant has not done
enough, or has not done the right kind of thing, to count as having attempted
the crime at all.70 The cases where special conceptual resources are needed are
those in which the defendant has committed an attempted crime but changed
his mind before completing it. In this way, abandonment sits in the same tem-
poral relation to the charged crime as remorse: it happens after that which we
take to be criminal. But abandonment of attempt seems to many people to be
relevant to responsibility in some way that is entirely different from the way in
which remorse is relevant. (No jurisdiction offers an affirmative defense of re-
7o. The so-called "probable desistance" test for the act element of attempt makes the mistake of
thinking that whether a defendant's conduct suffices depends on whether he will desist
from it. This is to hold that it is possible for two defendants who are duplicates in action,
mental state, and circumstances, but not in propensities that are unrealized in action or
mental state, to differ in whether they have attempted a crime. That is an indefensible result.
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morse, not even those that offer an affirmative defense of abandonment.) This
must be explained by an adequate account of the relevance of abandonment to
responsibility for attempt.
One initially appealing account of the relevance of abandonment is incapa-
ble of accounting for some of its central features. Consider the claim that we
give those who abandon a punishment discount- loo% off under the Model
Penal Code, which allows an affirmative defense -in order to incentivize aban-
donment.' Since the police can't stop everyone, we want to give people incen-
tives to stop themselves. So we want someone who has attempted a crime to
see that he has not thereby earned himself the punishment for completion; he
can still avoid that punishment by abandoning. There are two problems with
this line of thought: first, in a regime in which failed attempts are punished
less heavily than completions, as is the case for the vast majority of crimes in
the vast majority of jurisdictions in the United States, defendants already have
incentives to abandon; by abandoning, they can avoid the enhanced penalty for
completion. This implies that it is at least an open empirical question whether
any more attempts are abandoned in a regime that allows mitigation or an af-
firmative defense for abandonment than are abandoned thanks to the punish-
ment discount for falling short of completion. Second, and more importantly,
this rationale is not available to those who think, as they should, that aban-
donment mitigates only when it is motivated in the right way. Someone who is
motivated to abandon by the prospect of a punishment discount is not properly
motivated.' Such a person is really no different from one who abandons be-
cause he thinks if he follows through he will be caught. So this intuitively ap-
71. For a trenchant economic analysis of this argument, see Murat C. Mungan, Abandoned
Criminal Attempts: An Economic Analysis (Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Public Law Research
Paper No. 652, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2344551 [http://perma.cc/NBH-X-W2L].
The argument is mentioned in many other places in the law and economics literature about
attempt. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Criminal Attempts, in i THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 546, 547-48 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Samuel Kramer, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Criminal Attempt: Marginal Deterrence and the Optimal Structure of Sanctions,
81 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 398, 401 (1990); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the
Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1193, 1217-18 (1985); Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the
Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1232, 1232-33 (1985);
Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment ofAttempts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 435 (1990).
72. Imagine denying that the motive for abandonment matters. Under such a view, anyone who
runs from the police when interrupted before completion of a crime is to be given mitigation
or defense on grounds of abandonment. This is to radically shrink attempt liability. Even
unflinching believers in deterrence as the sole purpose of criminal sanction, then, must rec-
ognize that the motive for abandonment matters. To ignore it would be to undermine, even,




pealing aspect of legal doctrine cannot be explained in its entirety by appeal to
the hope to incentivize abandonment.
How is it best explained? As we will see, the best explanation implies that
abandonment ought to mitigate a defendant's sentence but ought not provide
an affirmative defense.
B. Mitigating Factors and the Ceiling on Attempt's Sanction
The right way to think of the relevance of abandonment arises from appre-
ciating the grounds for the following undeniable fact: it is illegitimate to punish a
failed attempt more heavily than it would have been punished had it been completed.
This is not to say that there are no attempted murders, for instance, that are
rightly sanctioned more heavily than some completed murders. Rather, it is to
say that no attempted murder is rightly sanctioned more heavily than that very
murder would have been rightly sanctioned had it been completed. The best
rationale for this is that every reason to sanction attempt is a reason to sanction
completion, even if there are additional reasons to sanction completion that are
not reasons to sanction attempt. Only if there were reasons to sanction attempt
that were not reasons to sanction completion would it be acceptable to give a
greater penalty to an attempt than to completion of that attempt. It is an impli-
cation of the fact that attempts are criminalized under the Transfer Principle
that there can be no reasons to punish an attempt that are not reasons to pun-
ish completion of that attempt. So the appealing idea that the punishment for
completion sets the ceiling for the punishment of attempt is an implication of
the Transfer Principle.
The fact that reasons for sanctioning attempt are all reasons for sanctioning
completion of the attempt also implies that many mitigating factors for the
sentence for completion are also mitigating factors for the sentence for attempt.
Seeing this requires recognizing that often a factor mitigates thanks to the fact
that it silences a reason for sanctioning. If a reason for sanctioning completion
is silenced by the presence of a mitigating factor, and the silenced reason is also
in general a reason for sanctioning attempt, then the mitigating factor also mit-
igates sentence for attempt. I explain.
Mitigating and aggravating factors are never decisive. When such a factor is
present, there is a reason for issuing a lower or higher sentence, or one fewer
reason not to; the reasons in question rarely settle the question of what sanc-
tion to give. Hence a mitigating factor could be present and yet it might make
sense to give the defendant a greater than typical sentence because there are
several aggravating factors present also. Similarly, a mitigating factor might be
present, but there may be a reason for sanctioning that is in no way lessened by
the presence of the mitigating factor and which supports issuing a sanction of
typical size. In such cases, a mitigating factor is present but makes no differ-
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ence to the final sentence. In this way, mitigating and aggravating factors are
importantly different from either justifications or excuses. When a defendant
has a justification -he injured another in the execution of a public duty, for in-
stance- that settles the matter against punishment of the defendant. 3 We do
not weigh the justification against, for instance, the suffering of the victim, or
the dangerousness of the defendant; a justification deflects criminal liability
entirely. Similarly with excuse. Mitigating and aggravating factors, however,
are different. They merely figure into the calculus of reasons for sanction and
are therefore subject to all the vicissitudes of reasons; they can be present with-
out changing the outcome, or absent even when the outcome is to be changed.
Affirmative defenses, note, are all-or-nothing. When they are present, they
shield a defendant completely from criminal liability. This is why they are a
useful legislative tool for providing justified and excused defendants with what
they deserve. If a defendant acts in self-defense, for instance, the best way to
give him what he deserves is to provide him with a way of avoiding criminal
liability altogether. But an affirmative defense is the wrong tool to use when
the facts in question mitigate; to grant an affirmative defense when a mitigat-
ing factor is present is to provide defendants more than they deserve, for miti-
gating factors, by their nature, can be outweighed, at least potentially, by other,
aggravating factors. The conception of a factor as having some degree of
weight, and thus possibly being outweighed, is not available with an affirma-
tive defense.
Mitigating factors (and perhaps aggravating factors, too) can potentially
function in at least two importantly different ways. First, they can provide pos-
itive support for giving a lower sanction. Considerations of mercy function in
this way. If giving a lower sanction would be merciful, and if there are reasons
to be merciful, then there is a positive reason to give a lower sanction than
would otherwise be appropriate. Second, and more important for our purposes
here, mitigating factors can cancel the force of a reason to give a particular
sanction (say, a typical sanction) rather than a lower one. For instance, if the
fact that a crime was the defendant's first offense mitigates at all, it mitigates in
this way.74 Sometimes a reason in support of issuing a particular sanction ra-
ther than a lower one is the fact that the behavior punished is part of a pattern
of criminal conduct by the defendant. This reason - if it is one - for issuing a
particular sanction rather than a lower one is muted by the fact that the de-
73. MODEL PENAL CODE S 3.03 (Official Draft 1962).
74. Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, criminal history aggravates sen-
tence. U.S. SENTENCING GumEuINas MANuAL 5 4Ai.i (2004). This may be equivalent to al-
lowing the absence of criminal history to mitigate.
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fendant's crime was not part of a pattern at all. It will be argued here that
abandonment mitigates in this second way.
C. Why Abandonment Mitigates
Judges should and do pursue multiple goals in sentencing. They ought to
seek to deter the defendant from future crime, whether in or out of prison.
They ought to have their eye on the deterrence of other people besides the de-
fendant. Furthermore, they ought to consider whether the sanction is sufficient
to express solidarity with the victim in his loss. They ought to consider what
the defendant deserves and his prospects for, and need for, fundamental reha-
bilitative change. There is more besides. But there is one particular goal that, it
will be argued, is of relevance to our discussion here: judges ought to pick the
minimum sanction that would provide, by the defendant's own standards at
the time of the crime, a sufficient reason for him to have refrained. That is, one
of the things a judge should aim to do in sentencing is to give a sanction harsh
enough that, had the defendant anticipated it at the time of the crime, he
would have recognized sufficient reason to refrain. (More on this in a mo-
ment.) In general, however, judges have reason to give the lowest sanction that
is supported by this and other reasons for sanctioning. That is, if there is just as
good a reason to issue one sanction as another, then there is an additional rea-
son to issue the lower of the two. Putting these two things together, we reach
the result that, if knowing that he would suffer a year in prison would have
prompted the defendant to recognize sufficient reason to refrain, then that is a
reason to give a year rather than a year and a day. Conversely, if anticipation of
a year would not have been sufficient to prompt awareness of sufficient reason
to refrain, then there is reason to give a higher sanction.
When a defendant has abandoned an attempt for good reasons, he has al-
ready recognized sufficient reason not to complete the crime without anticipa-
tion of any sanction. Therefore, when the defendant has changed his mind, one
reason to give a sanction of some particular size is nullified. When a defendant
has abandoned an attempt, a judge cannot say, in favor of his decision to give
the defendant a year in prison, that anticipation of any lower sanction would
not have prompted the defendant to recognize sufficient reason to refrain.
Since the defendant recognized sufficient reason to refrain without anticipation
of sanction, such a claim would be untrue. Other reasons to sanction remain,
however-for example, the defendant is deserving of sanction for having
wrongfully tried to commit a crime, deterrence goals will be furthered by sanc-
tioning, the judge needs to express solidarity with those targeted by the de-
fendant- and so the fact of abandonment mitigates the sentence by silencing a
reason in favor of any given sentence without thereby silencing all such rea-
sons.
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Why should the sentence be such as to provide sufficient reason to have re-
frained from the crime? One rationale for this is rooted in deterrence. The
mechanism of deterrence is engagement with the defendant's mechanisms for
directing his own conduct; conditions are arranged so the defendant will direct
himself away from crime. On the not unreasonable assumption, common in
economics, that the mechanisms through which people direct their behavior
are guided by their conceptions of their reasons for action, deterrence then re-
quires sanctions harsh enough to provide people with sufficient reason, by
their own lights, to refrain. But this is not the only possible rationale. Those
who hold that the root of criminal culpability is misuse of the distinctive hu-
man capacities for recognizing and responding to reasons" will see a different
reason to avoid a sanction so low that the defendant would have recognized
sufficient reason to commit the crime even if he had anticipated the sanction.
Such a sanction would fail to place the defendant in anything like the place of
the law-abiding citizen, who would recognize sufficient reason to refrain from
crime even without anticipation of sanction. So there are multiple perspectives
from which we might justify issuing a sanction large enough that anticipation
of it would have prompted the defendant to recognize sufficient reason to re-
frain from the crime. There are therefore multiple perspectives under which
there is good reason to mitigate a sentence because one abandoned an attempt.
Notice that the argument just offered for treating abandonment as a miti-
gating factor in the sentencing of attempt appeals, implicitly, to the fact that
the reasons for sanctioning an attempt are all of them reasons for sanctioning
completion (a claim that follows from the Transfer Principle). After all, while
remorse after the commission of a crime might be a reason to give a lesser sen-
tence, it is not a mitigating factor thanks to the fact that the defendant would have
prospectively recognized sufficient reason to refrain even had he anticipated the lower
sanction. For all we know, the remorseful defendant was prospectively aware of
the sanction and did not take it to provide him with sufficient reason to refrain;
not until after completion did he realize that he shouldn't have committed the
crime. Why not say the same thing about the abandoned attempt? After all,
abandonment happens after the defendant's crime, namely the attempt, has al-
ready taken place. The answer is that abandonment tells us something about
the appropriate sanction for the completed crime the defendant attempted. The
completed crime would have deserved mitigation since the defendant recognized
sufficient reason to refrain from it without considering the typical sanction for
the crime. Furthermore, since the reasons to punish attempt derive from the
reasons for punishing completion, abandonment mitigates the attempt. It does
75. See supra Part II.
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so for distinctly different reasons from those that would support mitigating in
light of remorse.
This point can be put in another way by responding to an objection. It was
acknowledged earlier that there can be reasons for sanctioning completion that
are not reasons for sanctioning attempt. For instance, we might sanction com-
pletion as a way of expressing solidarity with an injured victim. This would not
be a reason to sanction attempts of that crime that fall short of injuring anyone.
Here we have our objection: how do we know that the reason for sanctioning
completion, which is cancelled by the fact of abandonment, is not of this kind?
How do we know, that is, that the silenced reason is also a reason to sanction
attempt? The answer ultimately comes from the Transfer Principle. To see the
answer, first consider the relevance to attempt of the fact that there are victims
of the completed crime. If we ask why we criminalize murder, for instance, the
harm to murder victims is a central part of the answer. But as I indicated in the
discussion of the Transfer Principle in Part I, if we ask why we criminalize at-
tempted murder, the harm to murder victims, a harm not realized in the at-
tempt, is still a central part of the answer. That observation, in fact, is central to
appreciating the role of the Transfer Principle in the law of attempt. So while it
is true that the expression of solidarity with victims is not a reason to sanction at-
tempts that have no victims, it is also the case that the fact that the completed
crime has victims does provide reason to sanction attempt; the reason just is
not the expression of solidarity with the victims, but something else. Similarly,
part of the reason to criminalize completed crimes is that they spring in part
from a failure to recognize sufficient reason to refrain from the crime. And part
of the reason to criminalize attempts is that completions involve that failure.
Therefore, if this reason to sanction completion is silenced, as I've suggested it is
when there is abandonment, then that reason for sanctioning attempt is simi-
larly silenced.
The further and final point worth emphasizing in this section is that we al-
so now have at hand an argument against granting an affirmative defense of
abandonment. As indicated earlier, to grant an affirmative defense in the face
of a particular condition's being met-such as that the defendant abandoned-
is appropriate only if that condition undermines the rationale for assigning
criminal liability. An affirmative defense might also be appropriate if the rele-
vant condition cancels all positive reasons to sanction. But an affirmative de-
fense is the wrong tool if the condition in question provides one reason against
sanction, but potentially leaves in place many others. Such is the case with
abandonment. It cancels a reason for sanctioning-that is, failure to recognize
sufficient reason to refrain - but does not cancel all such reasons. Hence it
should be treated as a mitigating factor only; there should be no affirmative de-
fense of abandonment.
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D. The Motive for Abandoning
The rationale for mitigation on the basis of abandonment supplied here ex-
plains why the motive for abandonment matters. In brief, the reason for this is
that when the defendant abandons from some objectionable motive, then the
argument for abandonment-based mitigation fails to go through. To see this,
we need to consider each of the various types of objectionable motive for aban-
donment in turn.
The Model Penal Code offers an account of the various motives for aban-
doning that undermine abandonment's mitigating force. Under the Model Pe-
nal Code, the abandonment -what the code chooses to call the "renunciation
of criminal purpose" - must be both "voluntary" and "complete" to permit mit-
igation. But the Code defines these terms in such a way as to identify certain
motives for abandonment that undermine abandonment's mitigating force.
The relevant section of the Code reads:
[R]enunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated,
in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the in-
ception of the actor's course of conduct, that increase the probability of
detection or apprehension or that make more difficult the accomplish-
ment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if it is mo-
tivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a more ad-
vantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar
objective or victim.76
So the Code identifies roughly four kinds of motives for abandonment that
undermine mitigation. There is no mitigation if the defendant abandons be-
cause (a) there is a better chance he will get caught than he expected; (b) com-
pletion is harder than he expected; (c) there will be a better time or place for
the crime; or (d) there's a better victim for the crime.
Consider, first, defendants who abandon for the reasons described under
(a). The bank robbery, for instance, is abandoned after the defendant walks in-
to the bank, armed and ready to hold up the teller, but notices that a security
camera has been installed since he cased the bank. In cases of this sort, the
abandonment is predicated upon completion being punished in a way that is typical.
The reason that the new security camera provides the defendant with a reason
to walk away is that the defendant expects that completion would result in a
certain punishment that he has a strong desire to avoid. For all we know, were
he to anticipate a smaller than typical punishment, then the added risk of being
76. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) (Official Draft 1962).
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caught, given the unanticipated camera, would not outweigh the possibility of
filling his sack with money. Thus, by abandoning, he has not shown, as the ar-
gument for abandonment-based mitigation requires, that he would recognize
sufficient reason not to complete the crime even given a lower-than-typical
sanction for completion. For all we know, a lower-than-typical sanction would
not, given his motives for abandoning, provide him with sufficient reason to
refrain and so the argument for abandonment-based mitigation in his case los-
es its force.
Now consider cases in which the motive is of the sort described under (b),
in which completion is more difficult than expected. The bank robbery, for in-
stance, is abandoned at the same point as in our previous example (after the
defendant has walked into the bank, armed and intent on robbing it). But in
this case, the defendant abandons because he notices that the vault doors are
closed, where they were open when he cased the bank, and so the robbery
would require him to persuade a bank employee to open the doors for him.
There is no reason to believe that the defendant would have recognized suffi-
cient reason to refrain from completing the robbery had he anticipated a small-
er than typical sanction. The reason is that anytime anyone undertakes any
complicated task, such a task is thought to be worthwhile only if the rewards
outweigh the costs that must be borne in order to earn them. For all we know,
this defendant included the typical sanction (corrected for the probability that
he would have to suffer it) in his calculations before he walked into the bank.
The added work of having to open the vault doors tipped the scales against the
robbery. But were a cost of the robbery lowered-were a lower-than-typical
sanction for completion promised-then it is quite possible that the added
work to open the vault doors would be worth undertaking. As in the previous
hypothetical, for all we know, a lower than typical sanction would persuade the
defendant that he did not, after all, have sufficient reason to abandon. Like be-
fore, then, the argument on offer in this Part for abandonment-based mitiga-
tion fails when a defendant abandons for the reasons described under (b).
Similar considerations apply when the motives to abandon are like those in
(c), in which the defendant realizes that there will be a better time or place to
complete the crime, and (d), in which the defendant realizes that there will lat-
er be a better victim. Consider someone who abandons the bank robbery when
he realizes that a large daily deposit has been delayed and that it will therefore
be worth a lot of money to him to rob the bank later. Such a person decides
that the risk in this instance is not worth the reward, but that the risk will be
worth the reward at a later time. But if robbing the bank now promised a
smaller than typical sanction, then for all we know, the risk involved in robbing
the bank now would be worth the reward to be expected from robbing it now;
after all, less would be risked if the expected sanction for robbing the bank now
were lower than typical, and so less would be gained by waiting to rob the bank
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later. Again, the promise of a lower than typical sanction, given the motive for
abandonment, might actually prompt the defendant not to recognize sufficient
reason to abandon. Similarly, the defendant who abandons his attempt to rob
Bank X because he decides he will be better off robbing Bank Y instead (a case
involving a motive of type (d)) sees attractions in robbing Y that outweigh the
costs associated with the robbery, including the anticipated sanction (corrected
for the probability of being apprehended). But if the robbery of X were to
promise a lower than typical sanction, then there might not be sufficient reason
to switch targets.
In all these hypothetical cases, the motive for abandonment shows a sensi-
tivity on the defendant's part to the typical sanction. The defendant is weigh-
ing pros and cons and deciding to abandon given an assumption on his part that
there's a chance he'll suffer the typical sanction should he complete the crime. Thus,
when we have these motives for abandonment, it is also true that had the de-
fendant known before he committed the crime that he would suffer a certain
smaller than typical sanction for committing it, then he might have found suf-
ficient reason not to abandon his attempt. We therefore have no reason to think
that anticipation of a smaller than typical sanction would have been sufficient
for awareness of sufficient reason to refrain. As a result, when the defendant
has abandoned because of the motives the Model Penal Code identifies, the
reason for giving a particular sanction rather than a lower one still applies; it is
not silenced by the fact of abandonment. So the argument for abandonment-
based mitigation does not go through.
Notice that Arin Ahmed's reasons for abandoning are not of the sort that
are sensitive to the expected sanction for the completed crime. That sanction -
if it is even possible to imagine what kind of sanction there could be for such
behavior, perhaps a penalty issued to one's surviving family members-plays
no role in her reasoning; it is not something to be outweighed by other consid-
erations but is simply trumped by the reasons that she had for abandoning.
Hence, even if the sanction were smaller, she still would have abandoned her
attempt. What follows is that in her case, the argument for abandonment-
based mitigation goes through, and so her abandonment is a legitimate miti-
gating factor.
Could there be other motives for abandonment that undermine the case for
abandonment-based mitigation, motives that do not fall into any of the four
categories the Model Penal Code identifies? Yes, there could. Consider again
the case of People v. Taylor,7 mentioned at the opening of this Article, in which
the defendant's intended rape victim talked him into believing that she would
have consensual sex with him, and thus convinced him to stop trying to force
77. 598 N.E.2d 693 (N.Y. 1992).
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her to have sex with him, before locking him out of her apartment. In Taylor,
the court rejected the possibility of an abandonment defense under a statute
derived from the Model Penal Code. The court did this on the ground that the
defendant's renunciation was not "voluntary and complete." However, as not-
ed at the opening of this Article, it is far from clear why it was not, under the
Model Penal Code's official definitions of those terms. The best case for think-
ing that it was not comes from construing the defendant's motives as of type
(c) -to construe him, that is, as having merely decided to postpone the rape
until later, perhaps after the two returned from the liquor store. But it is hard
to see why he would have stopped his attack if this were his motive. After all, if
he were intent on rape, he could have completed it despite the victim's efforts
to persuade him that he could later have consensual sex with her. Rather, it
seems that Taylor forced his way into the apartment with a preference for con-
sensual over non-consensual sex, but intent on having sex with the victim re-
gardless. When he became convinced that consensual sex was a possibility, he
pursued it, perhaps anticipating that, should it stop seeming possible, he
would return to his pursuit of non-consensual sex. However, even construed in
this way, it is not unreasonable to think of Taylor as having changed his mind.
His intention to have non-consensual sex was predicated on an assumption:
consensual sex was not possible. When he came to believe this assumption was
false, he changed his mind and abandoned his plan to have non-consensual sex
with the victim. This isn't to say that Taylor ought to enjoy abandonment-
based mitigation. He ought not to. But why not? The Model Penal Code does
not provide us with a tool for answering; only by distorting the facts are we
able to construe Taylor's motive for abandonment as one of the four sorts that
undermine abandonment's mitigating force under the Code.
The reason that Taylor's sentence for attempted rape should not be miti-
gated is because, for all we know, Taylor's preference for consensual over non-
consensual sex was at least in part derived from the fact that non-consensual
sex brings with it a certain punishment, the typical punishment for rape. So, if
we ask whether someone who abandoned rape for Taylor's reasons would have
done so even if the penalty for rape were lower than typical, we find that the
answer might very well be "no." After all, had the penalty been lower than typ-
ical, then Taylor may have thought that the prospect of consensual sex, bring-
ing with it the risk that he would not have sex with the victim at all, was not
worth pursuing. He would abandon only if he thinks that consensual sex out-
weighs non-consensual sex, a calculation quite possibly made by considering,
among other things, the typical penalty for non-consensual sex.
In short, the argument offered here helps us to identify the crucial question
that must be answered in deciding whether to grant mitigation on the basis of
abandonment: does the fact that the defendant abandoned his attempt show
that the defendant would have been dissuaded from completing the crime even
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if a lower than typical sanction were given for completion? The answer is no
when the defendant abandoned for any of the four types of reasons identified
by the Model Penal Code. But the answer is no also when the defendant aban-
doned for reasons like Taylor's, even though those reasons do not fall into any
of the Model Penal Code's four categories. Legitimate abandonment-based
mitigation is hard to come by, even harder than under the Model Penal Code,
since there are motives for abandonment that undermine its mitigating force
but that are not identified as such by the Code.
E. Taking Stock
This Part began by identifying an implication of the fact that attempts are
properly criminalized thanks to the fact that completions are: the reasons for
sanctioning an attempt derive from reasons for sanctioning the corresponding
completed crime. This allowed us to identify a class of factors that mitigate
sentence for attempt- those that silence a reason for issuing a particular sanc-
tion, rather than a lower one, to the corresponding completed crime. By silenc-
ing a reason for issuing a high sanction for completion, we thereby necessarily
silence a reason for issuing a high sanction for attempt, given the Transfer
Principle. In general, the fact that a defendant prospectively recognized suffi-
cient reason to refrain from the crime, without considering the typical sanction
for that crime, silences a reason to issue a typical sanction rather than a lower
one. This reasoning supports mitigating sentence for the attempt, even though
abandonment occurs after the attempt, thanks to the special relationship be-
tween the reasons for sanctioning attempt and the reasons for sanctioning
completion.
CONCLUSION
This Article offers a theoretical framework for thinking about criminal at-
tempts and draws doctrinal implications from that framework. The theoretical
framework consists, in essence, of three components: (i) an account of the
grounds for the criminalization of attempts, labeled the Transfer Principle, ac-
cording to which attempts are implicitly criminalized when we criminalize
completed crimes; (2) an account of a wider range of intention-based commit-
ments than has heretofore been recognized; and (3) an account (drawing on
(2)), labeled the Guiding Commitment View, of the necessary and sufficient
conditions for being a criminal attempt of the sort that is implicitly criminal-
ized when we criminalize completed crimes. To attempt a crime is to be com-
mitted by one's intention to each of the components of success and to be guid-
ed by that intention.
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As we have seen, this theoretical framework allows principled resolution of
three seemingly intractable problems that arise in the adjudication of attempt.
Three particularly important doctrinal recommendations arise from this reso-
lution: (i) a solicitation rises to the level of a criminal attempt only if the de-
fendant asked another to realize a result element of the completed crime, and
not if he asked another to realize an act element. (2) If the defendant believed
or intended that the circumstantial elements of the completed crime were in
place, then they do not need to be shown to have been in place for conviction
for attempt; if, however, the defendant was aware only of the possibility that
the circumstantial elements were in place, then the prosecution must show
them to have been present to establish the prima facie case for the attempt. Fi-
nally, (3) abandonment of an attempt for reasons that show the defendant to
have recognized sufficient reason to refrain from the crime without considera-
tion of the prospect of sanction ought to mitigate sentence for attempt and
ought not to constitute an affirmative defense. If adopted, all three of these
recommendations would bring our practices of adjudicating criminal attempts
in line with the principles that animate their criminalization in the first place.
The philosopher Peter Strawson, writing about free will, insisted that in
thinking about that topic, we should remind ourselves of some "commonplac-
es":
We should think of the many different kinds of relationship which we
can have with other people- as sharers of a common interest; as mem-
bers of the same family; as colleagues; as friends; as lovers; as chance
parties to an enormous range of transactions and encounters. Then we
should think, in each of these connections in turn, and in others, of the
kind of importance we attach to the attitudes and intentions towards us
of those who stand in these relationships to us, and of the kinds of reac-
tive attitudes and feelings to which we ourselves are prone ....
The object of these commonplaces is to try to keep before our minds
something it is easy to forget when we are engaged in philosophy, espe-
cially in our cool, contemporary style, viz. what it is actually like to be
involved in ordinary inter-personal relationships, ranging from the
most intimate to the most casual.i 8
As Strawson saw it, the necessary conditions of moral responsibility are those
that we find implicit in indispensable social practices of interaction and en-
gagement with others. He urged us, in thinking about what human beings
must be like such that we can be held morally responsible for our behavior and
78. Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in FRE WILL 72, 76-77 (Gary Watson ed., 2003).
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hold others responsible, to focus on the varied and complex facts about others
and ourselves to which we respond as part of social life, and to which certain
responses and not others are particularly appropriate. It is because of its role
there that, for instance, intention is so important to responsibility. It is one of
the things to which we respond with, among other things, resentment and
gratitude; it is one of the things to which some responses, including but not
limited to moral emotional responses, and not others, are appropriate.
It is not just this that "our cool, contemporary style" can lead us to forget.
It can also lead us to forget the degree to which the assignment of criminal re-
sponsibility ought to be, even if it is too rarely, itself an entrenched and integral
part of the web of social interactions to which we are necessarily subject thanks
to living together in a state. We need an account of what is and should be in-
volved in the assignment of criminal responsibility that demonstrates and ex-
hibits this entrenchment. We must recover the sense in which the assignment
of criminal responsibility is an essential part of participation in the many and
varied relationships we have with each other as citizens.
The study of criminal responsibility for attempt is not special in this re-
gard. But it is one place in which the theorist is likely to despair, as Jerome Hall
did,79 of the possibility of providing an account of what we are, or should be
doing, that bears deep links to the simple interactions of everyday life. We are
prone to conceive of the activity as nothing more, for instance, than the post
hoc rationalization of the zealous desire to intervene earlier and earlier in the
lives of those who, for independent reasons if for any at all, we have classified
as inhabiting the wrong side of the law. But this is just pessimism. The law of
attempt is the simple interaction between father and daughter writ large. It
bears more than an analogical relation to the prohibition of that form of trying
that we prohibit implicitly when we prohibit conduct. In fact, it is that prohibi-
tion. Or, at least, so it has been argued here.
79. Hall, supra note 2, at 789.
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